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Summary 
In this study we have looked at the concept of public procurement for innovation, and tried to 
reveal the main barriers that prevent successful procurement for innovation to take place. A 
natural next step has been to explore the nature of these barriers, and through this understand 
how they can be managed. In order to accomplish this, we have conducted a case study on ICT 
projects in the specialised health services, building on existing literature in the fields of 
purchasing, innovation, public management and public procurement.  
Similar to scholars before us, we conclude that the key to public procurement for innovation is 
to have a collaborative relationship between the public customer and the supplier. By this we 
understand interaction in all the phases of the procurement, including the development and 
piloting stages of the innovation process. These stages, we found, can either be a part of the 
commercial procurement, or take place in a pre-commercial procurement preceding it. In case of 
the first, it is important to ensure that the contract does not restrict the conditions for the 
development stage with too many specifications. In the case of the latter, the challenge is to 
avoid a gap between the pre-commercial and ensuing commercial procurement.  
In the end, collaborative relationship is about the interaction between people in the supplying 
and buying organisation. In our case we identified three main actors, namely the supplier at one 
side, and the procurer and user at the other. We argue that collaborative relationship can only 
take place if they have the ability (the right competence), willingness (the right incentives) and 
possibility (the right resources) to take part in such a relationship, and if any of these three 
factors are not present, they constitute a barrier to public procurement for innovation.  
Underpinning all of this is the requirement for a long-term strategic thinking. We argue that 
public procurement for innovation is distinctly different from regular procurement in the sense 
that it sets out to explore new possibilities, rather than exploit existing solutions. The advantages 
of innovation will commonly not manifest itself in the short term, but can have a significant 
impact on the activities in the long run, and ultimately lead to better public services. A public 
organisation that primarily focuses on efficiency in the short term will fail to see this benefit, and 
as such not be able to provide the competence, incentives and resources required for public 
procurement for innovation to take place. 
For practitioners our study comes with implications particularly for managers in procurement 
and operations, who have to work on providing the conditions for collaborative relationship to 
take place in the cases of public procurement for innovation. This requires support from top 
management, who has to see the long-term benefit of this approach. For researchers, we have 
provided a model on public procurement for innovation, which will be useful for further studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sammendrag 
I denne studien har vi sett på konseptet innovasjon i offentlige anskaffelser, og forsøkt å finne 
barrierene som er til hinder for dette. Vi har videre undersøkt disse barrierene, for å forstå 
hvordan de kan håndteres. For å oppnå dette har vi gjennomført en case studie på IKT-
prosjekter i spesialisthelsetjenesten, med en foregående litteraturstudie innenfor innkjøp, 
innovasjon, offentlig sektor og offentlige anskaffelser.  
I tråd med forskere forut oss, har vi konkludert med at det avgjørende aspektet for innovasjon i 
offentlige anskaffelser er en relasjon mellom offentlig kunde og leverandør som bygger på 
samarbeid og tillit. Med dette sikter vi til omfattende interaksjon i alle leddene av en 
innkjøpsprosess, inkludert stegene for produktutvikling som den vil omfatte. Denne 
produktutviklingen kan både skje som en del av den kommersielle anskaffelsen, eller i en 
foregående pre-kommersiell anskaffelse. I det første tilfellet er det avgjørende at kontrakten som 
inngås ikke er til hinder for en påfølgende utviklingsfase ved å spesifisere produktet for mye. I 
det andre tilfellet er utfordringen å unngå at det oppstår en kløft mellom den pre-kommersielle 
og den kommersielle anskaffelsen. 
En samarbeidsrelasjon handler i utgangspunktet om personene som deltar fra leverandøren og 
kundens side. Her er det tre aktører som er sentrale: leverandøren, innkjøperen og brukeren. Vi 
argumenterer for at en samarbeidsrelasjon kun kan finne sted om disse aktørene har evnen (den 
rette kompetansen), viljen (de rette insentivene) og muligheten (de rette ressursene) til å delta. 
Dersom en av disse faktorene ikke er tilstede, vil det utgjøre en barriere for innovasjon i 
offentlige anskaffelser.  
Grunnleggende for at disse tre faktorene kommer på plass er en langsiktig, strategisk tankegang. 
Vi argumenterer for at innovasjon i offentlige anskaffelser skiller seg fra vanlige anskaffelser ved 
at de i større grad tar sikte på å utforske nye muligheter, framfor å utnytte eksisterende løsninger. 
Det følger av dette at nytteverdien av innovasjonene som regel ikke vil være synlig i et kortsiktig 
perspektiv, men kan ha vesentlig innvirkning i det lange løp, og med dette bidra til bedre 
offentlige tjenester. En offentlig etat som hovedsakelig fokuserer på kortsiktig effektivitet, vil i 
mindre grad være i stand til å se nytten av innovasjon i offentlige anskaffelser, og dermed heller 
ikke være like villige til å tilrettelegge for dette i form av kompetanse, insentiver og ressurser.  
Studien vår er i særlig grad relevant for ledelsen i henholdsvis innkjøp og de operasjonelle 
enhetene i offentlige etater, ettersom det er deres ansvar å legge til rette for samarbeidsrelasjoner 
som fører til innovasjon i offentlige anskaffelser. Dette vil imidlertid kreve støtte fra 
toppledelsen, som må se nytten av dette i et langsiktig perspektiv. For forskere har vi laget en 
modell for innovasjon i offentlige anskaffelser, som vi mener vil være nyttig i videre forskning. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The interest for public procurement as an instrument to induce innovation is growing, which has 
a twofold explanation. The first is innovation. For decades governments have embraced the idea 
of an innovation policy, where different means are applied to spur innovative activity in the 
private sector, and through this gain competitive advantage over industries in other countries. A 
good example of its relevance today is the Innovation Union launched by the EU in 2010, where 
it is emphasised that innovation is necessary to stay competitive as a region. However, 
innovation is also increasingly becoming a topic for the public sector in its own right, as it 
becomes clearer that an efficiency focus alone is not enough to provide quality services to 
citizens. As such, the governments look both to the private and public sector for the benefits of 
innovation.  
The second reason for the interest is the changing role of public procurement. Similar to how 
purchasing has received a more prominent role in companies following the realisation in the 
1980s that “purchasing must become supply management” (see Kraljic, 1983), an understanding 
is slowly building that the same applies to the public sector. This is relevant for innovation, as 
there is an underlying assumption that making purchasing more strategic is related to its ability to 
contribute to innovation (see Castaldi et al., 2011).  
In Norway public procurement for innovation can still be considered to be in its infancy, at least 
when it comes to implementation. On policy level the topic was raised in 2008 with two white 
papers on innovation policy and public procurement respectively (Fornyings- og 
administrasjonsdepartementet, 2008-2009; Nærings- og handelsdepartementet, 2008-2009). In 
2013 the same government released its strategy for public procurement for innovation (see 
Departementene, 2013). As such, the political signals are clear, and it is now up to the public 
entities to put the ideas into practice. This is no simple task, and to successfully implement 
public procurement for innovation one will have to overcome many barriers. 
This is the starting point of this study, which leads directly to our problem statement:  
Problem statement:  
What are the barriers to public procurement for innovation and how can they be managed?  
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1.2 Research questions 
By dividing the problem statement in two parts, we arrive at two research questions for our 
study.  
1.2.1 RQ1: What are the barriers to public procurement for innovation? 
The first step is to identify possible barriers, which we will do through a literature review of both 
relevant purchasing and innovation theory. Based on this we will formulate propositions on what 
we consider the most important barriers, and see if these propositions conform to the empirical 
data we collect. This part of the analysis will seek to verify or disprove the propositions; to the 
degree such inferences can be made through our qualitative case studies. 
1.2.2 RQ2: How can barriers to public procurement for innovation be managed? 
A more challenging task, we will attempt to see how identified barriers to public procurement for 
innovation can be addressed. It is our assumption that few of these barriers will have simple 
solutions, but indeed that they have numerous underlying causes and influence each other. 
Nevertheless, through our analysis of the theoretical and empirical study we hope to be able to 
point to some actions that can lead to more effective public procurement for innovation. This 
analysis will also follow the propositions that we construct in the theoretical study. 
1.3 Structure of the study 
Our paper follows a traditional structure of theoretical and empirical study followed by a cross-
case analysis, as depicted in Figure 1. The theoretical study will have three steps, starting with an 
examination of the basic concepts of public procurement for innovation (PPI), i.e. what it is, 
why it is important and lastly how procurement can induce innovation. Following this is a review 
of frameworks from both purchasing and innovation literature, which can help explain the 
drivers underlying PPI. As a result of this review we will go through relevant categories and 
construct a set of propositions, i.e. a number of possible barriers that might exist to prevent 
successful public procurement for innovation.  
In the empirical study, we look at the Norwegian health care sector, where focus is on the 
procurement of innovative ICT solutions to hospitals. More specifically, we will look at two of 
four regional health authorities (RHA), with two procurement projects in each RHA. In the 
cross-case analysis, we will take the empirical findings and compare them to the propositions 
developed in the theoretical study.  
The first research question will be addressed in part in the theoretical study, where we will 
propose a number of barriers, which we seek to verify through the analysis of the empirical 
study. This will be summarised in the conclusion. The second research question will be 
addressed primarily in the analysis, and furthermore in the conclusion. 
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Figure 1: Structure of the study 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
While the topic of our study forces us to take a relatively broad approach, with the topics of 
purchasing and innovation in literature, and the health sector as our empirical starting point, we 
have tried to make some limitations. The reason for this has been both to reduce complexity, 
and moreover the limitations we have had in terms of time and resources. 
First of all, we will focus on barriers at the customer side, i.e. in the public entities, and not look 
on barriers at the supply side. In our empirical study, we will limit ourselves to projects where the 
private sector has supplied innovative ICT solutions to the specialised health services through 
procurement. This is illustrated in Figure 2.  
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Furthermore, we do not look at make-or-buy decisions. When it comes to complex ICT 
solutions, it is unlikely that the specialised health services will move in a direction where this is 
moved inhouse. As such, it is more likely that they decide to outsource the complete 
management of ICT of the hospital to an organisation not directly under public control. 
However, even in this case most of our findings in this study would still apply, e.g. such an 
organisation would still have to follow the regulation on public procurement. Furthermore, we 
will not look at concessions and so-called public-private partnerships (PPPs). As far as we are 
aware of, they are not relevant for ICT solutions in the specialised health services in Norway.  
  
Figure 2: Scope of the empirical study 
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2 Research methodology 
According to Yin (2009), the research methodology of a study needs to reflect the research 
objectives. We have chosen to divide our research in two parts in order to answer our research 
questions: a literature review and an empirical case study. In the following we present our 
research methodology. First we will present the search strategy, article selection and review 
procedure of our literature review. Afterwards we will justify the selection of research design and 
explain the data collection of the empirical data. Finally, we will evaluate the research 
methodology we have applied.  
According to Bryman and Bell (2011), authors addressing methodological issues often make a 
distinction between quantitative and qualitative research. They describe quantitative research as a 
research strategy that often emphasises the quantification and measurement in the collection and 
analysing of data, as opposed to qualitative research that emphasises words rather than 
quantification. Furthermore, Myers (2008) claim that qualitative research is the most appropriate 
if you want to study a particular topic in depth, and argue that qualitative research is more 
suitable if there is not so much previously published of the topic in focus. Although the 
academic field of public procurement for innovation is receiving an increasing amount of 
attention, the more specific area of barriers has not been much researched. We therefore argue 
that a qualitative approach is suitable.  
In our research we wanted to investigate barriers preventing public procurement for innovation, 
and through an in-depth exploration uncover why it seemingly struggles to reach its potential. 
Furthermore, during the creation of both theoretical background and empirical data we wanted 
to rely on sources of a qualitative nature, as “qualitative research is uniquely suited to “opening 
the black box” of organisational process (Doz, 2011, p. 583). Consequently, we have chosen a 
qualitative approach to our research methodology in this paper.  
Dubois and Gadde (2002, p. 555) propose a process where theoretical framework, empirical 
fieldwork and case analysis evolve simultaneously, and claim that “the researcher, by 
continuously going ‘back-and-forth’ from one type of research activity to another and between 
empirical observations and theory is able to expand his understanding of both theory and 
empirical phenomena”. The process of systematic combining is displayed in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Systematic combining. Adapted from Dubois and Gadde (2002) 
In our study we set out to investigate the relationship between barriers to public procurement for 
innovation found in the literature and in reality. Accordingly, the process of systematic 
combining is suitable, as it according to Dubois and Gadde (2002, p. 556) can be described “as a 
nonlinear, path-dependent process of combining efforts with the ultimate objective of matching 
theory and reality”. In our paper, we agree with Dubois and Gadde (p. 555), who claim that 
“theory cannot be understood without empirical observation and vice versa”. 
During our research we have continuously overlapped between data analysis and data collection, 
a processes described as matching by Dubois and Gadde. Accordingly, we have avoided forcing 
data to fit preconceived or pre-existing categories of barriers in our framework, and rather 
applied a parallel development. For instance, some of the analysis uncovered that we were 
lacking important aspects in our case study, and we therefore arranged two of the last interviews 
during the last weeks before finalising the paper.  
Furthermore, a process described as direction and redirection involved the use of multiple sources, 
which served not as verification, but rather as a provider of new dimensions and unknown 
aspects of our research problem. Instead of directing data collecting activities towards the search 
for specific data in line with the current framework, we utilised unanticipated data to further 
develop our framework and also broaden our search for theoretical concepts. This was the case 
when we established our potential barriers. The categories are both based on the literature study 
and what we uncovered as important aspects in reality.  
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2.1 Literature study 
In our paper we have conducted a literature study to get an overview of the academic field 
concerned with our study. According to Yin (2009), a common mistake in case studies is to 
generalise the results through statistical generalisation. Therefore we wanted to perform a 
literature search in order to allow us to do analytic generalisation by comparing previously 
generated theory with the empirical results of our case study.  
Our literature study has served as a point of departure for our barrier framework, and we have in 
our work applied the following classifications of Locke and Golden-Biddle (1997). We aimed to 
construct an intertextual coherence – researching existing knowledge and organising it in order to 
show how different research relates to each other and our paper. Furthermore, our paper 
intended to build a progressive coherence – outlining the build-up of an area of knowledge that is 
generally acknowledged. Additionally, we agreed with Bryman and Bell (2011, p 91) who claim 
that outlining existing literature “is a means of developing the significance of your research”.  
2.1.1 Search strategy 
An important choice when performing a literature search is the distinction between a keyword 
search and journal search (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Our research theme of barriers to public 
procurement for innovation has been built upon research from a broad range of subjects, such as 
innovation, procurement and literature discussing the public sector. As no single journal would 
be able to cover our research topic sufficiently, we favoured a keyword search over a journal 
search.  
Another important choice is between a systematic review and narrative review (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). According to the recommendations of Bryman and Bell, a systematic review in the form 
of a comprehensive, unbiased literature search is to be favoured in order to ensure replicability 
and ensure a reliable foundation for the research. Still, we wanted to perform a narrative review 
without focusing on explicit criteria for inclusion or exclusion of relevant literature, as it 
according to Bryman and Bell (p. 101) may “be more suitable for qualitative researchers”. We 
knew that such an approach would reduce the reliability of our study (as further described in 
2.3.2), but decided that it was more important to allow the possibility of snowballing in the event 
of discovering other articles thought relevant in footnotes or bibliographies. The concept of 
snowballing was an important aspect of our literature search, as our background within strategic 
purchasing has had limited concern with the public sector and our initial search scope was 
therefore too narrow.  
In the literature search we used Google Scholar as our main search engine, thereby getting an 
overview of both accessible and non-accessible literature. As Google Scholar comprises sources 
of a varying quality, we made sure only to rely on peer-reviewed journals and scholarly books.  
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Consequently, semi-academic articles were excluded. In some cases we used supplemental search 
engines such as Scopus or ScienceDirect, particularly in the event of searching for a specific 
article. Our keywords were created based on selected subjects, namely innovation, public 
innovation, purchasing, public procurement, and public procurement for innovation. Generally, 
research concerning the private sector was easier to obtain compared to the public sector. 
2.1.2 Review procedure 
Our literature review was conducted according to the following procedure. First, articles or other 
sources containing keywords in the title or abstract were included in a pre-selection. Thereafter, 
the abstracts were read and articles thought to be less relevant were excluded. Finally, the 
remaining sources were included in a thorough review, and structured in a table sorted by the 
appropriate research theme. During the review, notes regarding the following were made in the 
table: authors, year, journal, citations, title, research method, key takeaways and intended use. By 
structuring the information regarding our literature we wanted to establish an overview and 
furthermore simplify the process of writing up our theoretical background. The resulting table is 
presented in Appendix 1.  
In the event of discovering relevant literature through references or bibliographies during the 
process of creating the review table, the new literature was included according to the procedure 
described. Likewise, if we during the gathering of empirical data uncovered research areas in 
which our literature background did not describe to a satisfactory level, we applied the systematic 
combining methodology and expanded our search according to the described procedure.    
2.2 Empirical study 
2.2.1 Selection of research design 
According to Yin (2009) and Wacker (1998), two widely recognised researches within the field of 
research methodology, there are no research method superior to the other, although certain 
research methods fit better to certain purposes. In the following we will present arguments for 
our choice of research design. First we will explain why we chose to do a case study, then we will 
outline why we do a multiple-case study rather than a single-case, before finally describing our 
case selection rationale.  
In order to assess when to use different research methods, Yin (2009) outlines three conditions; 
evaluating the form of the research question, the extent of control an investigator has over actual 
behavioural events, and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. As 
we have little control over behavioural events, and our focus is on contemporary events, the 
logic of Yin essentially leaves us with two possibilities: survey or case study. According to Yin, 
the difference here lies, somewhat simplified, in whether the research question is in the form of 
what (suggesting survey) or how (suggesting case study). As the research questions in our study set 
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out to uncover both what the barriers to public procurement for innovation are and how they can 
be managed, the most natural conclusion would be to do both a survey and case study. However, 
we have chosen only to do a case study, for two reasons. 
The first is quite simply that the timespan of our study has been five months. While it is possible 
to conduct both a survey and a case study during that time, we decided that it would be better to 
focus on doing a proper case study. The second factor influencing our decision was an 
assessment of how important the results of a survey would be to answer the research questions, 
where we found that it would be helpful, but that it was not critical. As long as we could find the 
barriers in the cases we examined, this would be verification of its existence. However, the lack 
of survey would not tell us whether it was a prevalent barrier or not. As such, while a survey 
would have been useful, a proper case study was more important, so that we could better 
understand the nature of the barriers, and through this hopefully find out how they could be 
overcome, i.e. answering our second research question.  
According to Yin (2009), a case study is beneficial in order to investigate a phenomenon within 
its real-life context and when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are blurry. As 
these characteristics will be representative for our case on specialised health services in Norway, 
the rationale for choosing a case study is strengthened.  
Having settled on case study as our empirical research method, we evaluated the advantages and 
disadvantages of single- and multiple-case designs (Yin, 2009). Yin recommends using multiple 
cases whenever there are resources available due to the increased possibilities of experiencing 
both direct and theoretical replication of events later used for theory building. Furthermore, Yin 
(p. 61) argues on in favour of multiple-case, as the analytic conclusions “will be more powerful 
than those coming from a single case”. Still, we acknowledge the arguments of Dubois and 
Gadde (2002), who claim that increasing the number of cases, with the same available resources, 
would result in more breadth, but less depth, and furthermore pay attention to the increased 
resource demand following a multiple-case, as proposed by Yin.  
Moreover, during the development of our empirical study attention was given to relevant 
subareas of our selected cases, concurring to the categories of our proposed framework. 
Therefore it follows that we according to the classification of Yin have applied an embedded 
multiple-case study design (see Figure 4).  In retrospect we acknowledge that some cases resulted 
in more insight than others, where e-kurve and Seekuence Medical were particularly valuable. 
However, it would have been hard to predict which cases that would prove most valuable 
beforehand. 
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Figure 4: Illustration of the embedded multiple-case study design for this study 
2.2.2 Data collection 
According to Yin (2009) there are six different methods of data collection, out of which we 
chose to apply three of them: documentation, archival records, and interviews.  
An important source of information has been documentation in the form of governmental white 
papers as well as organisational reports from health authorities. Additionally we have used 
archival records in the form of survey data from Statistics Norway. We recognise that despite our 
precautions, our empirical data will to some extent be coloured by the publisher. For instance, 
the governmental white papers we have used may reflect the political ambitions of the current 
Norwegian government. In order to mitigate the subjectivity we have applied multiple and 
supplemental sources whenever possible.  
The most important source, however, has been the interviews conducted throughout the study. 
During our data collection we have met with both regional health authorities, hospital trusts and 
suppliers, and we have travelled to Oslo, Drammen, Porsgrunn as well as Trondheim in order to 
perform the interviews. Additionally, we have performed two phone interviews in the event that 
it was most suitable for the interviewee. An overview of the interviewees is presented in Table 1. 
During the preparation of the interviews we created an interview guide to structure our interview 
process. The guide starts with outlining the context for our related case, before examining the 
connected innovation process. Afterwards we move over to the attached procurement process, 
and finish our interview with questions in relation to our proposed framework. Our interview 
guide is presented in Appendix 2. During the interviews our guide served more as guidelines for 
conversations, as we for instance realised that it was less appropriate to talk about procurement 
with a person in charge of implementing ICT solutions. We therefore adapted the conversations 
to the background of the interview objects.  
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Table 1: List of interview objects. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
Date Name Title Location Duration 
06.03.2013 Roger 
Presthus 
Account manager, Hemit 
(earlier project leader e-kurve) 
Trondheim 94 min 
08.03.2013 Bjørn 
Grønli and 
Kjetil Istad 
Head of innovation and director of 
purchasing and logistics, South-
Eastern Norway RHA 
Oslo 91 min 
10.04.2013 Ragnvald 
Otterlei 
Managing director, Posicom Phone 101 min 
16.04.2013 Harald 
Noddeland 
Manager of pre-hospital services, 
Vestre Viken HT 
Drammen 116 min 
17.04.2013 Morten 
Andresen 
Founder and vice president of 
strategy , Imatis 
Porsgrunn 104 min 
29.04.2013 Roger 
Presthus 
Account manager, Hemit 
(earlier project leader e-kurve) 
Trondheim 94 min 
07.05.2013 Ivar 
Myrstad 
Project manager, St. Olav’s HT Trondheim 86 min 
16.05.2013 Bård Skage Head of procurement, Central 
Norway RHA 
Trondheim 74 min 
21.05.2013 Andreas 
Grønbekk 
Project manager of regional chart 
and medication project, South-
Eastern Norway RHA 
Phone 57 min 
According to the classification of Yin (2009) we have performed in-depth interviews, asking 
respondents both about facts concerning the current case as well as their opinions about the 
events. Yin (2009) suggests that questions asked should be in the form of how instead of why, so 
questions are asked in an unbiased way and avoids defensiveness from the informant. We used 
both how and why questions in our interviews, as the latter were necessary to uncover causal links. 
However, we paid attention to asking the questions in such a way that did not come across as 
accusatory. Furthermore, we allowed our interviewees to assume the role of informants rather than 
respondents, so that they were able to provide insights into a matter and also initiate access to 
corroboratory sources of evidence. According to Yin, interviewees’ responses may be bias, 
subject to poor recall or inaccurate articulation. As we have asked for opinions of the 
interviewees this is a particular weakness of our case. However, we decided that these opinions 
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were crucial for our understanding of the cases, because they would uncover aspects that would 
not be described in other sources. We therefore argue that our choices are justified.  
Our data collection process has followed the three principles proposed by Yin (2009) in order to 
maximise the benefits of our evidence. The three principles are as follows: use multiple sources 
of evidence, create a case study database and maintain a chain of evidence in the case study. 
Multiple sources: We have aligned ourselves with Yin (2009, p. 116) who claim that “any case 
finding or conclusions is likely to be more convincing and accurate if it is based on several 
sources of information”. Accordingly, we have applied two of the four types of triangulation as 
proposed by Patton (2002): data triangulation and investigator triangulation. Data triangulation was 
established through the use of multiple sources such as documentation, archival records and 
interviews. We applied a strategy proposed by Yin (2009) in order to ensure a critical 
interpretation of these accounts, and sought to understand the purpose and audience of the data 
in order to avoid being misled. Furthermore, we applied four key questions to understand the 
subjectivity of the sources when analysing documents, archival records and interviews, as 
proposed by Bryman and Bell (2011):   
1. What kind of person, company or organisation has produced the item?  
2. Who (or what) is the main focus of the item – one specific politician, expert, organisation 
or technology?  
3. Who provides the alternative voices?  
4. What was the context for the item – an interview, the release of a report or an event?  
Moreover, investigator triangulation was achieved by having both authors of this paper present 
at all interviews and read all written material. Still, we recognise the weakness of our investigator 
triangulation, as both authors have a similar background. 
Create a case study database: Moreover, we established a case study database through the use 
of two separate collections. First, we have created a shared Dropbox folder containing articles, 
documents and interview recordings, and second we have created a shared Skydrive folder 
containing our written report. The folder structure makes the raw data available for independent 
inspection, which according to the principles of Yin increases the reliability of our study. 
Maintain a chain of evidence: Our last effort was to establish a chain of evidence through the 
creation of our research methodology. By describing our methodology we aim to allow external 
observers to follow the derivation of evidence from initial research question, literature review, to 
final conclusions.  
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2.2.3 Data analysis 
As we recognised the arguments of Yin (2009), who claim that “the analysis of data from case 
studies is one of the least developed and most difficult aspects of doing case studies”, we 
approached the creation of our data methodology in a systematically way. We aligned ourselves 
with Eisenhardt (1989, p. 539), who claim that “analysing data is the heart of building theory 
from case studies”, and wanted to establish a transparent methodology of data analysis based on 
the work of widely recognised authors.  
First, we applied the recommendations of Yin (2009) in order to improve the quality of the 
research investigation. Yin argues that the best preparation for conducting a case study analysis is 
to have a general analytic strategy, and furthermore present relying on theoretical propositions as 
the preferred strategy. Consequently we have applied this strategy in our research, and our 
theoretical study has resulted in a framework and theoretical propositions, which have 
furthermore shaped the data collection plan and therefore given priorities to the relevant analytic 
strategies.  
Second, we have applied one of the five analytic technics suggested by Yin (2009) in order to 
analyse the gathered data, namely the analytical technique of pattern matching. During our analysis 
we have outlined a framework based on a theoretical study suggesting theoretical propositions of 
expected findings in our case data, and thereafter compared an empirically based pattern with 
predictions from the theoretical study. The process of pattern finding has followed two 
subsections.  
Within-case analysis: According to Eisenhardt (1989, p. 540), within-case analysis “typically 
involves detailed case study write-ups for each site. These write-ups are often simply 
descriptions, but they are central to the generation of insight”. The within-case analysis of our 
case involved the selection of what information to include in the case descriptions presented in 
Chapter 4, and it was useful both in order with the large volume of data gathered and to 
familiarise with each case as a stand-alone entity.  We recognise this process as important to 
identify unique patterns of each case before pushing to generalise across cases. Furthermore, we 
wanted to establish a familiarity with each case in order to accelerate cross-case comparison. 
Our write-ups started after the interviews were conducted and consisted of creating detailed 
descriptions of the cases through the use of interview recordings, documents and archival 
records. Our descriptions were given a narrative structure according to a time-line arrangement 
of each case, and all descriptions were written individually for each case.  
Cross-case analysis: In our cross-case analysis we wanted to identify patterns within and 
between cases. During the identification process we relied on the theoretical propositions 
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established based on our theoretical study. This is in accordance with the suggestions of 
Eisenhardt (1989), who recommend selecting categories or dimensions and then to look for 
within-group similarities coupled with intergroup differences. In our cross-case analysis, we try 
to some extent to compare across cases, but perhaps more importantly, we draw different 
experiences from different cases. This is done in Chapter 5. 
According to Eisenhardt (1989, p. 541), cross-case searching tactics “enhance the probability that 
the investigators will capture the novel findings which may exist in the data”. Consequently, by 
applying this technique we wanted to go beyond our initial impressions, and we used our 
theoretical propositions as diverse lenses on the data when we established our data analysis.  
2.3 Evaluation of methodology 
In order to evaluate the quality of our research methodology we will adopt the four tests 
proposed by Yin (2009). In the following we will evaluate the extent to which each applied test 
fulfil the proposed criteria, and furthermore discuss what could have been done differently.  
2.3.1 Validity 
2.3.1.1 Construct validity 
Construct validity deals with the extent to which the operational measures we use are actually 
representing the concepts we study (Yin, 2009). Yin proposes three available tactics in order to 
increase the construct validity, which we have applied.  
Firstly, our study is built on a set of operational measures identified as barriers to public 
procurement for innovation both through a theoretical study, an empirical study and the 
subsequent analysis. In our study we have sought to define the constructs we use (see 3.1). Still 
we realise that various definitions exist both in academia and in real life. Even though we have 
been consistent in terms of our definitions, it has therefore been a challenge to ensure that 
operational measures are equally defined by all involved actors. The identification may be 
criticised of both subjective judgement and inconsistencies regarding perceived definitions 
amongst involved actors during every part of the process. In order to encourage converging lines 
of enquiry and mitigate subjective judgement, we therefore applied both data triangulation and 
investigator triangulation.  
Furthermore, our research methodology aimed to establish a clear chain of evidence, and thus 
allowing external investigators to follow how the measures applied represent the right concepts.  
Finally, we applied the last proposal of Yin (2009), as we had key informants review our 
empirical data after the write-up. We used this procedure in order to corroborate essential facts 
and evidence in our case report.  
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2.3.1.2 Internal validity 
Internal validity is concerned with the question of whether a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, are distinguished from spurious relationships 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011; Yin, 2009).   
In our study we want to explain why certain conditions in procurement projects of ICT in the 
specialised health services in Norway are hindering the realisation of the innovation potential in 
the projects. Our research involves investigating causal links between potential barriers and our 
case material, and in order to assure the internal validity of our findings we incorporated the 
analytic technique of pattern matching were we compared an empirically based pattern with a 
predicted one based on the theoretical study. However, no explicit criteria were given to 
determine how close a match had to be in order to be considered a match. It follows that the 
internal validity has been reduced.   
Furthermore, we have to a small extent addressed barrier interdependencies. We realise that in 
order to investigate all causal links related to barriers to procurement for innovation the barriers 
should have been addressed not only as independent, but also as interconnected conditions. We 
limited this to concentrate on the link between the each barrier and procurement for innovation, 
and find that more research would be needed to look at interdependencies. Nevertheless, we try 
to look at it when answering the second research question in 6.2. 
Additionally, internal validity for case studies concerns the problem of making inferences (Yin, 
2009). According to Yin (p. 43) a case study “involves an inference every time an event cannot 
be directly observed”. Much of the information used in our empirical case has been gathered 
through interviews, and often we collected personal opinions and reflections. Consequently 
inferences on the interviewees’ behalf and by us naturally have had to be made.  It follows that 
the internal validity of our study has thus reduced the quality of our research methodology, and 
in order to mitigate this limitation we had the interviewees review our empirical data and correct 
wrongful inferences.  
2.3.1.3 External validity 
External validity deals with defining the extent and conditions under which the results from this 
study can be generalised (Yin, 2009). In our case, the question is whether our findings can be 
generalised to other public organisations than the specialised health services, other products than 
ICT solutions, and to other countries than Norway. Unlike other research methods, such as 
survey, where it is possible to make statistical generalisation, case studies rely on analytic 
generalisation (Yin, 2009). This means that we generalise our findings according to a broader 
theory on public procurement for innovation. Therefore, it has been important for us to build a 
strong theoretical foundation for our study. 
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However, Yin also states that such generalisation does not happen automatically. Rather, the 
study must be replicated to other contexts (other organisations, products, countries) to see if the 
theory holds. As such, each iteration that supports the findings strengthens the theory. This is 
also one of the reasons why Yin (2009, pp. 60-61) promotes a multiple case study, stating that it 
leads to “increased possibilities of experiencing both direct and theoretical replication of events 
later used for theory building”. While all our cases are from within the same context, they also 
have differences and have provided different insight that one case alone would not have. 
2.3.2 Reliability 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011) reliability means that a repetition of the research process 
using the same method must necessarily lead to the same result. Our choices in our research 
methodology have to some extent lowered the level of reliability.  
In our paper we have thoroughly described our research methodology, and hence allowed for 
replication by other researchers. Our literature search strategy of using explicit keywords and 
Google Scholar will, as long as articles and journals are not added or removed from the search 
database, allow for replication. However, our narrative approach, without focusing on explicit 
criteria for inclusion or exclusion of articles believed to be relevant for our paper, has been 
coloured by personal bias and our article selection has therefore lowered the reliability of our 
study. By applying a set of inclusion criteria for article selection, i.e. pursuing a more systematic 
review, we could have increased the transparency, reduced the personal bias and hence increased 
the possibility for repetition of our research process. 
Additionally, we have developed our empirical study in parallel to the theoretical study according 
to the arguments of the systematic combining methodology of Dubois and Gadde (2002). Our 
data collection has therefore been altered all throughout the process in order to concur with 
newly uncovered aspects of the theoretical study. In particular, the first interviews were 
performed before our theoretical propositions were established, and we were therefore not able 
to look for empirical data directly related to the propositions. Completing the theoretical study in 
advance would have enabled a stricter data collection process and hence easier replication. We 
recognise these weaknesses in the quality of our research methodology.  
2.3.3 Total evaluation 
Bryman and Bell (2011) claim that qualitative research suffers from a lack of transparency, is too 
subjective and difficult to replicate, and furthermore lacks the ability to generalise the finding to a 
larger population. These are certainly issues that we have struggled with in order to ensure 
validity and reliability for our study. The lack of transparency we have tried to reduce through 
clear documentation of our research design and data collection, although the conversational 
nature of our interviews would make it hard for other researchers to replicate. The matter of 
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subjectivity we have tried to mitigate through the use of multiple sources, but as this has not 
always been possible, we have had to take into the account the personal views of our 
interviewees. In terms of generalisation, we are back to the discussion on statistical versus 
analytical generalisation, where we have worked to apply the latter through linking our findings 
with relevant theory. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge has been to ensure internal validity and find out what are true 
causal links, and what might be explained by other conditions. In the end, we arrive at a common 
challenge for research in social sciences, where the aim is to give meaning to the complexity of 
reality, but where it often is not possible to observe phenomena in isolation. Keeping the 
complexity in mind, we have tried hard not to draw too hasty conclusions. Nevertheless, we 
encourage readers not to jump to the end of this paper, but instead follow its course through 
literature review, case presentation and analysis, and make up their own conclusion. 
In the end, we find that given the time and resources at hand, we have managed quite well with 
the degree of validity and reliability of our study. It certainly has imprinted in us the critical mind 
of a researcher. 
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3 Theoretical study 
The theory chapter consists of three parts, as outlined in    
Figure 5. First we go through the definition (what), reasons 
(why) and government actions (how) of public procurement 
for innovation. Following this we will review frameworks 
that give insight to aspects driving public procurement for 
innovation. Based on these driving forces, or rather the lack 
thereof, we will in the last part propose a set of possible 
barriers, i.e. propositions that we would like to investigate 
further. 
3.1 The what, why and how of public procurement for innovation 
3.1.1 The what of public procurement for innovation 
Before defining public procurement for innovation, it is necessary to look at the three words that 
it comprises. While each of these could result in a discussion of its own, we will limit it here to 
explaining how we intend to use them.  
Procurement, or purchasing as it is more commonly called outside the public sector, can be 
defined as “[t]he management of the company’s external resources in such a way that the supply 
of all goods, services, capabilities and knowledge which are necessary for running, maintaining 
and managing the company’s primary and support activities is secured at the most favourable 
conditions” (van Weele, 2005, p. 12). Van Weele argues that procurement is a somewhat broader 
term than his definition of purchasing, while Arlbjørn and Freytag (2012) argue that purchasing 
is used for manufacturing and procurement in governmental circles. As there is no consistent use 
in academic literature, we will use the two terms interchangeably. Related terms, such as supply 
management and acquisition, will not be used. The only deviation we will allow ourselves from 
the definition given by van Weele is that we consider purchasing, or procurement, an activity that 
can be performed by any organisation, not only companies. A typical procurement process is 
illustrated in Figure 6, and we will return to this more in detail in 3.3.2. 
 
Figure 6: Procurement process (van Weele, 2005) 
Public, in the context of public procurement, denotes the nature of the purchasing organisation. 
While this could be understood as the entities that make up the local and central administration 
of a country, and as such distinct from private companies and non-profit organisations, we 
found in our study preceding this one that the distinction is not always that clear (Bjørnaas and 
   Figure 5: Structure of theoretical study 
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Schmidt-Horix, 2012). Borderline examples are public commercial enterprises, and in particular 
state-owned companies. We will not clarify this grey zone here, but instead establish that 
procurement conducted in the regional health authorities and health thrusts of Norway, the 
subject of our empirical study, falls within our understanding of public procurement. This can be 
justified both by the nature of the service provided, and the control the government has over 
these entities through ownership, regulations and the state budget. 
Innovation can be defined as “the management of all the activities involved in the process of 
idea generation, technology development, manufacturing and marketing of a new (or improved) 
product or manufacturing process or equipment” Trott (2008, p. 15). Different types of 
innovation can be separated by many characteristics, which will only be mentioned briefly here 
(see Bjørnaas and Schmidt-Horix (2012) for a more thorough description of the nature of 
innovation).  Innovation can be technological or non-technological and pertain to the product 
itself or the processes that lead up to it. Furthermore, many scholars separate between large, 
discontinuous, radical innovation and smaller, incremental innovation that builds on existing 
products and processes. Lastly, it is common to distinguish between innovation initiated by 
technology-push and demand-pull. Due to procurement representing a demand by a customer it 
is viewed as a representing demand-pull (Edler and Georghiou, 2007). A typical innovation 
process is depicted in Figure 7, and we will return to this more in detail in 3.3.2.  
 
Figure 7: Innovation process. Simplified from Rothwell and Zegveld (1985) 
With the three terms defined, we can continue to the definition of public procurement for 
innovation (PPI). Edquist et al. (2000, p. 5) who at that time used the analogous expression 
public technology procurement1, wrote that it “occurs when a public agency places an order for a 
product or system which does not exist at the time, but which could (probably) be developed 
within a reasonable period”. In a study made prior to this one, we argued that this definition 
could need some elaboration. First, we found it was useful to state explicitly that innovation can 
take place both in tangible goods and intangible services. Furthermore, innovation is not limited 
to the final product, but can also take place in processes within the firm, such as production or 
organisation. Lastly, Uyarra and Flanagan (2010) argue that public procurement is a multi-
objective policy, in which innovation often has a secondary role with respect to other goals. As 
such, they reason, public procurement for innovation should not only encompass situations 
                                                 
1 In later articles Edquist uses public procurement for innovation, and also explains in Edquist & Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia (2012a) that this expression has replaced public technology procurement in denoting the same 
phenomena. 
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where innovation is the explicit aim of the procurement, but also procurement that leads to 
innovation by incident. A good example of this is process innovation, which according to 
Hommen and Rolfstam (2009, p. 21) incidental, as it “[takes] place entirely within the boundaries 
of a producer organisation”. Or, put differently, the procuring organisation is purchasing the 
product, not the underlying processes, and as such any resulting process innovation cannot be 
intentional from the procurer. 
Following these considerations, we propose the following definition of public procurement for 
innovation (Bjørnaas and Schmidt-Horix, 2012): 
Public procurement for innovation: A purchase by a public organisation of goods and/or 
services with the explicit intent or implicit consequence of inducing innovation, whether of the 
procured product itself or of the underlying processes.2 
In cases where we want to address the distinction between explicit intent or implicit 
consequence, we will use the terms explicit PPI, i.e. the intention is to procure innovative 
solutions either because it does not exist or because existing solutions are considered inferior, 
and implicit PPI, i.e. where there is no intention to buy innovative solutions, but where the 
outcome still is that innovation takes place. Primarily we will focus on explicit PPI throughout 
our study, as we find it will be hard to develop strategies for procurement where innovation is 
incidental.  
It is also important to distinguish public procurement for innovation from regular procurement, 
which can be done using the concept of exploration and exploitation popularised by March 
(1991). The idea is that there needs to be a balance between “exploration of new possibilities and 
the exploitation of old certainties” where “[e]xploration includes things captured by terms such 
as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discover, innovation”, while 
“[e]xploitation includes such things as refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, 
implementation, execution” (March, 1991, p. 71). Almeida (2012) has proposed that public 
procurement for innovation can be understood as exploration procurement, while regular 
procurement is exploitation procurement. We will also use this distinction. 
As a subset of public procurement for innovation is the classification of developmental and 
adaptive PPI, which essentially builds on the difference between incremental and radical 
innovation (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012a). Here it should be added that the line 
                                                 
2 It should be emphasised that this definition excludes procurement of innovative products that have already been 
developed. For the same reason, we choose to use the expression public procurement for innovation instead of 
public procurement of innovation, as this may be misleading.  
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between developmental PPI and adaptive PPI is somewhat overlapping, and there also will be 
different views on where adaptive PPI ends and the continuous improvement of regular 
procurement begins. According to Hartley (2005) this distinction is elusive, and depends on the 
perception of stakeholders. Following the distinction between regular procurement and 
procurement for innovation, as well as the difference between adaptive and developmental PPI, 
we get three types, as presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Adaptive and developmental PPI 
Regular procurement Adaptive PPI Developmental PPI 
Continuous improvement Incremental innovation Radical innovation 
Known to the organisation New to the organisation New to the world 
Exploitation Exploration Exploration 
More rigorous typologies of public procurement for innovation have been developed by 
Hommen and Rolfstam (2009) and Uyarra and Flanagan (2010). These are closely examined in 
our pre-study, but we have chosen not to include them here (see Bjørnaas and Schmidt-Horix, 
2012). The main reason for this is that they are not directly relevant for our study, and presenting 
them would be a digression. 
A last expression we would like to clarify at this point is pre-commercial procurement (PCP), 
which is a procedure proposed by the European Commission for the procurement of R&D (see 
Apostol, 2012; Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012a). Pre-
commercial procurement is the name given to procurement of research and development (R&D) 
conducted in stages that precede that of commercial procurement, and which therefore is 
exempted from the EU directive on public procurement. The process will be further described in 
0. Edler and Georghiou (2007, p. 954) state that “the more innovative or idiosyncratic an 
innovation is, the more likely pre-commercial procurement can be appropriately applied”. From 
this we assume that pre-commercial procurement will be more prevalent in developmental PPI 
than in adaptive PPI. We do not, however, agree with Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia (2012a) 
that pre-commercial procurement is something different than public procurement for 
innovation. We will return to this discussion in the implications for research in 6.4. 
3.1.2 The why of public procurement for innovation 
Scholars generally point to all or some of the following three reasons for why innovation is 
important in the public sector, which in turn forms the rationale for achieving public 
procurement for innovation (see e.g. Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009; Dalpé, 1994; Edler and 
Georghiou, 2007; Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012a; Rothwell, 1984; Uyarra and 
Flanagan, 2010) 
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Improve public services: The main goal of procurement in public services is to provide quality 
services to the population (Dalpé, 1994; Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010). Innovation can play an 
important role in this, as pointed out by Edler and Georghiou (2007, p. 949): “Public demand, 
when oriented towards innovative solutions and products, has the potential to improve delivery 
of public policy and services, often generating improved innovative dynamics and benefits from 
the associated spillovers.”  
Address societal challenges: In addition to the primary mandate of providing public services, 
public entities also receive other instructions from the government, as a means of 
operationalising political decisions. On a larger scale, these instructions can be connected to 
societal challenges such as global warming, energy supply or ageing societies Edquist and Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia (2012a). Innovation becomes relevant to the extent it is required to address these 
challenges. 
Increase competitiveness: The objective of national competitiveness, or rather that of 
industrial organisations within the country, builds upon the notion that innovation leads to 
competitive advantage and that demand by the public sector can be a strong contributor to this 
development (Dalpé, 1994; Porter, 1990). Despite this, it can be argued that when it comes to 
the procurement on the functional level, the competitiveness of the supplier will not be of 
particular relevance. Instead, the quality of the public service provided and other top-down 
instructions will guide their decision. As such, competitiveness can be considered a secondary 
objective to the two aforementioned reasons, and providing innovative solutions will commonly 
benefit both the public procurer and the supplier. However, in cases where the public sector 
sources from abroad, the competiveness of the national industry might even be weakened. 
3.1.3 The how of public procurement for innovation 
The reasons for pursuing public procurement for innovation do not elaborate on how exactly 
governments can facilitate supplier innovation through its purchasing power. In our pre-study on 
literature on public procurement for innovation, we identified four main government actions (see 
Bjørnaas and Schmidt-Horix, 2012). The actions will be described below. Customer-supplier 
interaction will be further explored in 3.3.3, while customer sophistication and aggregation of 
demand are relevant for 3.3.5. Demonstration of use pertains more to the diffusion of 
innovation than the innovative activity itself, and it is not dealt with further in this study.   
Facilitate customer-supplier interaction: The fundamental aspect of interactive learning in 
innovation together with the inter-organisational nature of purchasing explains the importance of 
facilitating the interaction between the public customer and the supplier (see e.g. Edquist et al., 
2000; Hommen and Rolfstam, 2009; Rothwell, 1994). The aim is to reduce information 
asymmetry, i.e. situations where the supplier does not know what the customer needs or the 
24 
 
customer does not know what the market can offer (Edler and Georghiou, 2007). Examples of 
such facilitation can be the creation of platforms and systems where public entities can 
communicate their needs, or changing laws to be less stringent in terms of contact to suppliers. 
Increase customer sophistication: In addition to communicating their demand, public entities 
can play a more central role in the innovation process, which may take place in the conjunction 
of the two actors rather than at the supply side alone. Dalpé (1994) noted that customers with 
great technological capacity can contribute most the innovation. This may necessitate for public 
entities to build up certain competences. 
Aggregate demand: It is clear that innovation always entails a certain risk, and this has to be 
weighed against the potential reward. Aggregating demand, in essence centralising purchasing, 
can result in the required scale to reduce the market risk for the supplier and justify their 
development costs (Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009; Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Uyarra and 
Flanagan, 2010). Aggregation of demand can also lead to process innovation in later stages of the 
product life cycle (as it can justify processes that require higher investment) and standardisation 
(adopting a “dominant design” that other markets will follow). Nevertheless, there are also 
factors that advocate decentralisation, such as taking into account local differences in demand 
and making it possible for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to participate in the tendering 
process. 
Demonstrate use: A public entity may often not be large enough in itself to provide the 
required scale for the suppliers to build a sustainable business on the innovation developed. 
Aggregation of demand may not be feasible, or not enough, and the role of the public body will 
instead be to act as a show case for future customers (Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009; Edler and 
Georghiou, 2007; Moore, 2006). In other words, the possibility for consequent diffusion 
becomes important as to whether the supplier will proceed with the development. Examples of 
such spillover effects can be municipalities adopting the solution from the piloting municipality, 
or health trusts in other countries expressing interest in the product. 
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3.2 Framework review 
Several studies and frameworks exist to organise and structure procurement, innovation and 
procurement for innovation. We will now examine a selection relevant to our paper. The 
purpose is to create a foundation upon which we build a framework structuring barriers to public 
procurement for innovation. The aim is to create a foundation for establishing different 
categories affecting public procurement for innovation We have chosen research concerning 
both generic purchasing and generic innovation in addition to articles discussing the two 
concepts and how the relate. An overview illustrating whether the chosen articles relate to 
purchasing and innovation is displayed in Table 3. Most of the literature presented is based on 
the private sector and we will therefore end the presentation by outlining research concerning 
public innovation and purchasing.  
Table 3: Overview of articles 
 Purchasing Innovation 
  Private Public Private Public 
Castaldi et al. (2011) x  x  
Roy et al. (2004) (x)  x  
Jean et al. (2012) x  x  
Loewe & Dominiquini (2006)   x  
Schlegelmilch et al. (2003)   x  
Cousins et al. (2008) x    
Potts & Kastelle (2010)    x 
Telgen et al. (2007)  x   
 
3.2.1 Castaldi et al. (2011) Strategic purchasing and innovation 
Castaldi et al. (2011) suggest that innovation through purchasing is closely linked to making 
purchasing strategic, and argue that strategic purchasing can contribute to firm innovation 
activities. In their study, they develop a relational view of strategic purchasing where the 
purchasing function does not only include the resources of the purchasing function in itself, but 
also resources from the external relations with the firm’s suppliers and from the internal relations 
with other functions in the firm.  
First, they argue that the quality of the purchasing function is determining purchasing contribution to 
innovation. They state that “the same relations that render purchasing strategic are also 
instrumental for using innovation to build competitive advantage” (Castaldi et al., 2011, p. 984) 
and argue that a strategic purchasing function possess several of enabling factors for innovation. 
The strategic nature of the purchasing function is only one of the dimensions determining its 
quality, and the other dimensions include the knowledge and skills of purchasing professionals, 
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resources available, the status of purchasing in top management, and the risk perspective of the 
function.  
Moreover, Castaldi et al. (2011) advocate the degree of purchasing integration as positively related to 
a contribution of purchasing to innovation. Purchasing integration describes the extent to which 
purchasing is related to other functional areas, and includes participating in cross-functional 
teams, being involved in strategic decisions, and aligning purchasing’ knowledge and capabilities 
with other functional areas.  
Finally, the extent to which suppliers are involved is related to the purchasing contribution to 
innovation. According to Castaldi et al. (2011), the supplier involvement is characterised by the 
degree that purchasing is aware of the company’s supply base and that key suppliers are clearly 
distinguished and engaged through long-term relations. In addition, emphasis is put on the 
responsibilities the suppliers assume regarding the development of a part, process or service for 
the benefit of a buyer’s current or future development projects.  
Based on the rationale above, Castaldi et al. (2011) establish a conceptual model stating that the 
purchasing contribution to innovation is dependent on the quality of the purchasing function, 
purchasing integration and supplier involvement. The purchasing contribution is defined as “the 
input, support and necessity of the purchasing function for the firm’s formal and informal 
innovation processes” Castaldi et al. (2011, p. 989), and this is illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Purchasing contribution to innovation. Adapted from Castaldi et al. (2011) 
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3.2.2 Jean et al. (2012) Drivers and dependence outcomes of supplier innovation 
generation in customer-supplier relationships 
In their study from 2010, Jean et al. build on the knowledge-based view of Grant (1996) and 
examine how the supplier innovation generation in customer-supplier relationships is based on 
knowledge and learning. They identify factors in relation to customer-supplier relationships that 
influence the process of innovation generation, namely supplier market knowledge acquisition, 
relationship learning, systems collaboration and technological uncertainty, and outline how 
innovation in customer-supplier relationships is based on “the application (or utilization) of 
external knowledge to generate new products or processes in exchange relationships” Jean et al. 
(2012, p. 1005). In Figure 9 the factors positively related to supplier innovation generation are 
displayed, and they are briefly described below. 
 
Figure 9: Supplier innovation generation. Adapted from Jean et al. (2012) 
The first factor is supplier market knowledge acquisition and relationship learning. The rationale is based 
on the relationship’s ability to create new knowledge in order to facilitate innovation, an 
extension of viewing innovation as the outcome of knowledge integration, application, and 
reconfiguration as proposed by Grant (1996).  
The second factor is systems collaboration, which Jean et al. (2012, p. 1011) define as “the extent to 
which customers and suppliers strive to make and keep their supply chain systems compatible 
with each other”, and claim that system collaboration may eliminate potential integration barriers 
between exchange parties, and thus facilitate interaction and coordination between customers 
and suppliers. Accordingly, the ability to identify and exploit information from the environment 
increases and systems collaboration may stimulate innovation generation.   
The third factor is technological uncertainty. According to Jean et al. (2012), unpredictable changes in 
the technological environment may result in a shorter product life cycle, forcing firms to 
introduce innovations both in order to avoid the threat of being obsolete and also being able to 
capitalise on emerging markets.  
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Accordingly, the study shows how market knowledge acquisition, relationship learning, systems 
collaboration, and technological uncertainty may drive supplier innovation generation in 
customer-supplier relationships. 
3.2.3 Roy et al. (2004) Innovation generation in supply chain relationships 
In their study on innovation generation in supply chain relationships, Roy et al. (2004) investigate 
how both internal and external factors in upstream supply chain relationships affect innovations. 
After conducting an extensive literature review, they propose that innovation generation in 
supply chains relationships is a consequence of interactions between buyers and sellers. They 
argue that buyer-seller interactions form the basis of knowledge transfer and therefore the 
adaptive learning process. Furthermore, they claim that innovation is the result of an interactive 
learning process. Accordingly, they base their research on buyer-seller relationships and aim to 
explicate the link between interaction and innovation generation. 
Roy et al. (2004) propose two segments of factors that may affect innovation generation in a 
supply chain relationship. The first segment involves factors that are internal or dyadic to the 
interfirm buyer-seller relationship. These factors may be managed bilaterally through managerial 
action on either side of the relationship, and include factors such as IT adoption, commitment, and 
trust. The other segment includes factors external to the relationship and these are generally not 
under the control of the dyad. The external factors include tacitness of technology, stability of demand, 
and network connections. A figure illustrating the finding of Roy et al. (2004) is displayed in Figure 
10. 
 
Figure 10: A model of innovation generation in supply chain relationships. Adapted from Roy et al. (2004) 
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3.2.4 Loewe and Dominiquini (2006) Overcoming the barriers to effective innovation 
In their study, Loewe and Dominiquini (2006) investigate 550 large companies in order to 
uncover and structure the keys to a systematic innovation capability. First, they discover that 
several obstacles are consistent across industries, and furthermore that the examined companies 
deals with the obstacles in a piecemeal rather than a systematic way. Consequently, the 
companies’ innovation efforts fail or at best result in a one-time success the company would be 
unable to repeat.  
In order for companies to achieve a systematic process enabling repeated innovation, Loewe and 
Dominiquini (2006) create a framework of four keys related to the innovation effectiveness of a 
company. Together, the keys address underlying interrelated root causes of innovation 
effectiveness and the four keys are leadership and organisation, culture and values, people and 
skills, and processes and tools. The framework is displayed in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11: Keys to a systematic innovation capability. Adapted from Loewe and Dominiquini (2006) 
In their study, Loewe and Dominiquini (2006) describe how processes and tools involve a systematic 
approach with supporting tools enabling idea generation and elaboration, in addition to pipeline 
and portfolio management. Furthermore, leadership and organisation is described in terms of 
visionary leaders and organisation aligned around a common definition of innovation, while 
culture and values involve a collaborative, open culture with incentives positively related to 
challenging the status quo. Finally, people and skills contribute to innovation effectiveness through 
a critical mass of people across the organisation proficient in innovation skills.  
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3.2.5 Schlegelmilch et al. (2003) Strategic innovation 
Based on a theoretical foundation, Schlegelmilch et al. (2003) establish a formal specification of 
the strategic innovation construct and describe strategic innovation as the concept of applying 
innovation to corporate strategy. Furthermore, they define strategic innovation as “the 
fundamental reconceptualization of the business model and the reshaping of existing markets (by 
breaking the rules and changing the nature of competition) to achieve dramatic value 
improvements for customers and high growth companies” and aim to distinguish the concept 
from more incremental improvements in cost, quality or both (Schlegelmilch et al., 2003, p. 117).   
The authors identify four drivers (see Figure 12) that jointly foster strategic innovation, namely 
culture, processes, people and resources. According to Schlegelmilch et al., a prerequisite for 
strategic innovation is a company’s dominate culture, routines and unwritten behaviour, and the 
establishment of a questioning attitude that challenges orthodoxies in addition to a deep sense of 
urgency. Furthermore, they claim that the traditional analytic strategy innovation process should be 
challenged by a process of creative exploration in order to identify opportunities overlooked by 
conventional processes.  
 
Figure 12: Drivers to strategic innovation. Adapted from Schlegelmilch et al. (2003) 
In addition, Schlegelmilch et al. argue how people, both within and outside the company, have 
crucial influence on strategic innovation, as it requires as broad-based perspective. Accordingly, 
the dialogue about strategy and innovation should cross-functional and hierarchical boundaries, 
and people outside the company should be involved in order to provide an outside-in 
perspective. Finally, Schlegelmilch et al. argue contrary to conventional logic that is claiming that 
companies should leverage its existing resources and match internal capabilities with outside 
opportunities, which according to the authors is biased for the status quo and thus constraining a 
company’s future.  Instead, they argue that strategic innovators should create strong relationships 
within networks providing complementary capabilities, and thus be able to assess business 
opportunities without being constrained by where the company it at the given moment.  
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3.2.6 Cousins et al. (2008) The supply wheel 
Cousins et al. (2008) propose a framework that provides a classification of five decision areas 
that make up a purchasing strategy, and outline how this relates to the corporate and business 
strategy of an organisation. An illustration of the supply wheel is displayed in Figure 13. A key 
point of the model is that all elements are related, and that altering one of the elements will affect 
the others.  
 
Figure 13: The supply wheel. Adapted from Cousins et al. (2008) 
In the centre of the supply wheel is corporate and supply strategy, and it illustrates how the remaining 
elements must be aligned with the corporate and business strategy of the organisation. Cousins et 
al. (2008, p. 13) state that “only when the activities and strategies of the purchasing function are 
aligned with the overall strategies of the firm can purchasing be a strategic function.”, and 
accordingly differentiate between purchasing as a strategic function and purchasing strategy.  
There are five circumferential elements of the supply wheel, the first of which is skills and 
competencies. Cousins et al. (2008, p. 111) argue that a variety of skills and competencies must be at 
a required level in order to be able to fulfil the organisations strategic objectives, and claim that 
an organisation “is only as good as the skills and competencies that its personnel possess”.  
Second, the organisational structure of supply may have profound effects on corporate and supply 
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strategy. Traditionally, organisational design have varied from vertical functional silos and cross-
functional teams, and according to Cousins et al. there are three basic types of structures for 
organising purchasing: centralised, decentralised and hybrid structures. The third circumferential 
element involves managing inter-firm relationships from a strategic perspective. Cousins et al. claim 
that a typical distinction of relationships is made according to a spectrum ranging from 
adversarial and transactional based to highly collaborative partnership arrangements, and 
furthermore define relationships as processes. Accordingly they imply that relationships require 
inputs, often in the form of resources, and also outputs, such as price or cost reduction. Fourth, 
the element of cost-benefit analysis focuses on balancing cost, benefits and relationship strategies 
within the supply chain. According to Cousins et al., all costs along the entire procurement value 
chain should be evaluated, and developing a total cost of ownership model might provide 
valuable assistance in purchasing decisions. The fifth and last circumferential element is 
performance measurement. Cousins et al. claim that a purchasing and supply chain performance 
measurement system should assist strategy implementation through systematic monitoring and 
evaluating purchasing activities. They argue that as purchasing has become more strategic, the 
traditional short-term efficiency measures are becoming less suitable, and they claim that a more 
systematic approach is appropriate.  
3.2.7 Potts and Kastelle (2010) Public sector innovation research 
In a study investigating the analytic context of public sector innovation studies, Potts and 
Kastelle (2010) outline a practical model of public sector innovation. 
The authors start of by presenting the Schumpeterian perspective of private sector innovation, 
where innovation is the basic dynamic mechanism of market economy growth and organisations 
engage in innovation as a response to innovation in other organisations. Furthermore, Potts and 
Kastelle (2010) outline a considerable theoretical foundation and argue that the competitive 
incentive of the private sector is a very weak force in the context of public sector innovation. 
Instead, the authors claim that the public sector is striving towards efficiency, as a result of seeking 
to maximise deliverables from a finite budget.  
Furthermore, Potts and Kastelle (2010) argue that the incentive structure of the institutional 
domains is profoundly different. They claim that in terms of motivation and accountability, the 
incentive structure of the private sector is relatively straight-forward; accountability is to the 
owners of the business, while motivational incentives often are monetary rewards. These 
concepts are often aligned in the private sector, as seen in an entrepreneurial start-up, where 
those who back the innovation receives both due compensation if the innovation is a success as 
well as carries the risk if it fails.  
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As a contrast, public sector innovation involves “an instrumental disjointed phase, where a 
mandate of political entrepreneurship is then passed to the public sector to develop and 
implement, but with none of the excitement and prospect attaching to the idea being carried 
through” Potts and Kastelle (2010, p. 125). Furthermore, failure is particularly expensive in the 
private sector as a result of competitive media and opposition monitoring. Consequently, the 
actors responsible for performing the innovation will not be involved in the reward structure, 
while they still will be held accountable if the innovation fails. This creates an asymmetric incentive 
structure.  
3.2.8 Telgen et al. (2007) Public procurement in perspective 
In their study from 2007, Telgen et al. aim to put public procurement in perspective by 
combining existing literature and grouping it for clarity and oversight. According to them, it is 
well accepted that public procurement differs from purchasing in the private sector, and that the 
demands on public procurement are greater and more highly varied. Furthermore, the claim that 
these demands are additional to those on private sector and therefore define the complexity of 
public procurement.  
First Telgen et al. (2007) start with external demands. They explain that transparency is demanded 
by public procurement, in order to assure equal opportunities for all bidders and clear process, 
and that the public sector is expected to act with integrity, in order to avoid improper, wasteful or 
corrupt practices. Furthermore, the public entities are held accountable for the effectiveness, 
efficiency, legal and ethical manner of public procurements and are expected to set an example 
by exemplary behaviour.  
Second, public procurement must simultaneously serve multiple goals, both in terms of various 
internal goals – such as cost efficiency or the delivery of services – and political goals. In addition 
there are several stakeholders – such as citizens, elected officials and procurement officers – that 
may have different objectives or conflicting interests in which public procurement must relate.  
Third, public procurement is budget driven and the budget that determines what is procured. In 
addition, the budgets are open and accessible to the public, thus changing the relations between 
buyers and suppliers considerably. Furthermore, the public sector is often characterised by layers 
of government and consequently mutually dependent budget situations. These arrangements may 
cause sub-optimisation. Additionally, the specific cultural setting of public organisations, where 
employees are somehow concerned with public interests, causes risk aversion and a tedious 
decision-making processes.  
Fourth, the process of public procurement is restricted by regulatory demands and it is consequently 
bound by legal rules and organisational procedures. These regulations are often extensive and 
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dominate the image and activities of public procurement. According to Telgen et al. (2007), some 
authors see the regulation of procurement process as the determining characteristic of public 
procurement, and the rules often prevent establishing and engaging in long-term relationships 
with suppliers.  
Fifth and last, the public organisations inhibit multiple roles. They are large buyers and according 
to Telgen et al. (2007), the share of the national economy involved in public procurement 
typically range from 10 per cent up to 80 per cent for some developing countries, while they 
predominately buy goods and services from the citizens they are expected to serve. Additionally, 
public entities face the situation of reciprocity when they are buying from supplies that are 
buying from the same public entities. Lastly, by its very nature the public sector is both a player, 
decision maker on the rules of the game and referee, as it determines the rules and regulations 
according to which it has to operate. 
Telgen et al. (2007) outline how public procurement is forced to balance a number of interests 
while operating under complex and sometimes conflicting demands. A summary of these 
demands is presented in Table 4.  
Table 4: Demands on public procurement (Telgen et al., 2007) 
External demands Transparency 
Integrity 
Accountability 
Exemplar behavior 
Internal demands Simultaneously serving multiple goals 
Several stakeholders 
External pressures Budget structure 
Mutually dependent budget situations 
Regulatory demands on procurement Difficult to establish long-term 
relationships 
Adoption of multiple roles  Large buyers 
Reciprocity 
Both player and decision maker 
  
 
 
35 
 
3.2.9 Comparing the frameworks 
The purpose of presenting the frameworks above was to create a foundation for the following 
development of propositions in the next part. In comparing the frameworks, we found five 
categories which occurred in many of the frameworks (as shown in Table 5), and which we 
found to be the most important for further exploration. This decision is also in part based on 
what we observed was relevant in the initial stages of our empirical data collection (see 
discussion on systematic combining in chapter 2). From the aggregation into five categories it 
follows that there are certain categories that we did not include, such as performance 
measurement and cost-benefit analysis from Cousins’ supply wheel, or technological uncertainty 
from Jean et al. As such, there might be barriers that we will not describe in this study. However, 
we think that we have covered the most important categories. Unlike the other frameworks, we 
have also decided to merge knowledge and organisation, as we find them to be tightly integrated, 
as we will describe in 3.3.5. The five categories will form the basis for the development of the 
propositions in the next part. 
Table 5: Categorising barriers to public procurement for innovation 
 
Strategic 
nature Process 
Relation-
ship Culture 
Knowledge 
and 
organisation 
Castaldi et al, 2011      
Purchasing integration     x 
Supplier involvement   x   
Purchasing function x     
Jean et al., 2012       
Supplier market 
knowledge acquisition   x  x 
Relationship learning   x   
Systems collaboration   x   
Technological 
uncertainty      
Roy et al., 2004      
IT technology adaption   x   
Trust   x   
Commitment   x   
Tacitness of 
technology      
Stability of demand      
Network connections   x   
Loewe and      
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Dominiquini, 2006 
Leadership and 
organisation     x 
Culture and values    x  
People and skills     x 
Processes and tools  x    
Schlegelmilch et al, 
2003      
Culture    x  
Processes  x    
People      x 
Resources      
People and skills     x 
Processes and tools  x    
Cousins et al, 2008      
Organisation structure     x 
Portfolio of 
relationships   x   
Cost-benefit analysis      
Skills & competencies     x 
Performance measures      
Corporate and supply 
strategy x     
Potts and Kastelle, 
2010      
Efficiency      
Asymmetric incentives    x  
Telgen et al., 2007      
External demands  x    
Internal demands      
External pressures      
Regulatory demands 
on procurement  x x   
Adoption of multiple 
roles      
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3.3 Development of propositions  
In the last part of the theory chapter, we will go through the five categories identified, as shown 
in Figure 14. These are categories that we expect to contribute to public procurement for 
innovation, and where it therefore should be possible to uncover potential barriers. 
.  
Figure 14: Categories for potential barriers 
In the following we will go through each of the five categories, drawing from the frameworks 
already presented, and supplement this with other applicable theory. Based on this we will 
develop a set of potential barriers, or propositions, which we will use in our cross-case analysis in 
chapter 5, in light of the empirical data collection in chapter 4. Primarily we will look at the five 
categories independently, although we assume that they will be dependent on each other. When 
answering RQ2 in 6.2 we will also try to draw some links between the different categories. 
However, the focus will be on each proposition independently, in order not to create a 
complexity that exceeds the size of this study. 
The development of the propositions will be conducted as follows. First we will present the 
concept, focusing on private purchasing literature. Based on this we will formulate a supposition 
which suggests a causal link to innovation. Next, we will turn to the public sector, and consider 
the applicability of the first supposition. Following this we will make a second supposition that 
the casual link in the first supposition is not sustained, and hence constitutes a barrier. Putting 
together the two suppositions we will formulate a proposition. 
 
  
38 
 
3.3.1 Strategic nature of procurement 
Before we look at the role or nature of purchasing in an organisation, we present the definition 
of strategic purchasing by Carr and Smeltzer (1997, p. 201): “The process of planning, 
implementing, evaluating and controlling strategic and operating purchasing decisions for 
directing all activities of the purchasing function toward opportunities consistent with the firm’s 
capabilities to achieve its long-term goals”. Carr and Pearson (2002) describe how a purchasing 
function can range from nonstrategic, or clerical, to strategic. The differences between the two 
are described in Table 6.  
Table 6: Differences between clerical and strategic purchasing. Based on Carr and Pearson (2002) 
 Clerical purchasing Strategic purchasing 
Focus Short-term Long-term 
Importance in the eyes of 
top management 
Purchasing viewed as nonvalue-
adding by top management 
Purchasing viewed as important 
resource by top management 
Involvement in strategic 
planning process 
Purchasing personnel provide 
minimal input to the firm’s 
decision-making process 
Purchasing involved in firm’s 
strategic planning process 
Status compared to other 
functions 
Purchasing has a low status 
compared to other major 
functions in the firm 
Purchasing treated as an equal 
to other major functions in the 
firm 
Interaction with other 
functions 
Purchasing is reactive rather 
than proactive in performing 
purchasing activities 
Purchasing proactively seeks 
opportunities to provide input 
Purchasing competence Purchasing professionals have 
little relevant purchasing skills 
with respect to strategic 
planning and managing the 
firm’s suppliers 
Purchasing professionals 
possess the knowledge and skills 
to perform at a strategic level, 
and receive training to enhance 
their skills 
According to Carr and Pearson (2002, p. 1034), “a strategic purchasing function conducts 
activities that require more proaction on the part of purchasing staff as it interacts with others 
within and outside of the firm”. The last part illustrates how strategic purchasing is a central 
theme both for the organisation across functions (see 3.3.5) and the relationship to external 
organisations (see 3.3.3). However, it is important to note that the other four categories do not 
necessarily require the presence of a strategic procurement function. In fact, Castaldi et al. (2011) 
uncovered a group of companies that they called entrepreneurial, which had a low to medium 
degree of strategic purchasing, due to the fact that they were small in size and could not hold a 
large purchasing staff. Nevertheless, these companies scored high on supplier involvement, and 
the purchasing contribution to innovation was similar to that of companies that had a strategic 
purchasing function. 
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In this category we will consider the nature of the strategic purchasing function, which is defined 
by the following four indicators: “(1) presence of a long term plan including supplier 
relationships; (2) alignment between purchasing and firm strategy; (3) top management including 
input from purchasing about future supply needs and constraints; and (4) coordination of 
purchasing strategies across business units.” (Castaldi et al., 2011, p. 987). Keeping the 
entrepreneurial companies in mind, we still find that for most organisations, especially larger 
ones, there is likely to be a strong link between the degree of strategic nature of the purchasing 
function and its impact on innovation. We therefore present the following supposition: 
Supposition: Procurement for innovation requires a strategic purchasing function 
Harland et al. (2007) present seven stages of public procurement, which can be viewed as 
moving from clerical to strategic (see Figure 15). They argue that most public procurement 
entities fall within stages 2-5, i.e. that there is no alignment with government policy objectives. 
They furthermore state that innovation becomes a priority only in the seventh stage, when 
procurement has become a deliverer of broader government policy objectives. 
 
Figure 15: Stages of public procurement. Adapted from Harland et al. (2007)  
Following this, we formulate the following supposition: 
Supposition: Procurement does not have a sufficiently strategic role in the public sector. 
Putting together the two suppositions, we arrive at our first proposition: 
Proposition 1: The lack of procurement as a strategic function is a barrier for public 
procurement for innovation 
40 
 
3.3.2 Process 
A common innovation process model is illustrated by what Rothwell and Zegveld (1985) labelled 
the third generation innovation process, see Figure 16. While newer models exist, including 
aspects such as cross-functional organisation (see 3.3.5) and inter-organisational interaction (see 
3.3.3), the model still gives a good understanding of the common steps of the innovation 
process. It starts with an idea, which either comes from an identified demand (demand-driven, 
pull-driven) or through new technologies or other possibilities at the supply side (supply-driven, 
push-driven).  Following this are steps of development and prototyping, before production is 
scaled up and commercialised for the market place.  
 
Figure 16: Third generation innovation process. Adapted from Rothwell and Zegveld (1985) 
While this model is directed specifically towards innovation within traditional manufacturing, a 
similar structure will apply for other types of innovation. An example of this is given by the 
Stage-Gate model introduced by Cooper (1990) see Figure 17. This model also introduces 
another important concept in innovation theory, namely the existence of evaluation gates, where 
a senior group can decide to continue on to the next phase, kill the project, or do the previous 
phase again.  
 
Figure 17: Stage-gate model. Adapted from Cooper (2009) 
The purchasing process is, at first sight, very different to the innovation process. One model for 
a purchasing process is provided by van Weele (2005), see Figure 18. It starts with a demand 
from an internal customer, which is then translated into a specification. This in turn forms the 
basis for the supplier selection, which for the public sector commonly takes the form of a 
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tendering process, to ensure equal treatment. After the contract has been signed, the following 
steps relate to order fulfilment, i.e. that the external supplier delivers what the internal customer 
requested. 
 
Figure 18: Purchasing process. Adapted from van Weele (2005) 
Some scholars have argued that this model does not take into account the need for interaction 
with the market before the contracting stage, as the purchasing organisation may not be able to 
set the specifications alone. van der Valk and Rozemeijer (2009) suggest an expansion of the van 
Weele model to include this, see Figure 19. The topic of interaction will be further explored in 
3.3.3. 
 
Figure 19: Expanded purchasing process. Adapted from van der Valk and Rozemeijer (2009) 
Upon closer examination, we find that the innovation process and the purchasing process share 
the same start and end in the case of demand-driven innovation. Both start with a demand and 
end with the fulfilment of this demand. The nature of demand is not the same, however. In the 
case of the innovation process, the demand refers to the external customer, while in the case of 
the purchasing process, it is an internal customer. Nevertheless, when it comes to public 
procurement for innovation, we think that the innovation and purchasing processes should be 
viewed in conjunction and not separately. We therefore formulate the following supposition: 
Supposition: Procurement for innovation can only take place when the innovation process is a 
part of the purchasing process. 
In terms of public procurement, there is little literature that shows to any link between the 
procurement and innovation process, even in literature specifically addressing public 
procurement for innovation. However, some scholars (Apostol, 2012; Edler and Georghiou, 
2007) mention the concept of pre-commercial procurement in Europe, which is presented in 
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3.1.1. This model describes how it is possible to divide the procurement into different stages, 
with innovation stages taking place before the commercial procurement, and the pre-commercial 
procurement process is illustrated in Figure 20. The idea by the European Commission is that it 
is possible to involve multiple companies in each of the stages, and make separate arrangements 
for each stage. However, it should also be possible to have only one company throughout the 
pre-commercial procurement phase. Nevertheless, Edler and Georghiou (2007), state that “to 
preclude monopolistic structures resulting from pre-commercial procurement, at least two 
competitors should enter the field-test stage.” In either case, when reaching the commercial 
stage, the public organisation needs to conduct a normal tendering process, where anyone, not 
only those participating in the pre-commercial stage, can participate. 
 
Figure 20: Pre-commercial procurement process. Adapted from European Commission (2007) 
However, as Apostol (2012) points out, the adoption until 2010 of pre-commercial procurement 
was rather poor, and we can therefore assume that such procurement processes are still not 
adopted in many public entities. We therefore formulate the following supposition. 
Supposition: The innovation process and purchasing process are not linked in the public sector. 
Putting together the two suppositions, we arrive at the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: The lack of integration of the innovation process in the purchasing process is a 
barrier to public procurement for innovation. 
As part of the procurement process, in particular the phase of supplier selection, it befits to 
mention the procedures outlined in the EU directives on public procurement, which also pertain 
to Norway. These directives have been subject to significant discussion, both in academic world 
and in the member countries. It has also been suggested that the directives inhibit the flexibility 
of the procurers, such as restricting the interaction with suppliers (Telgen et al., 2007). In the 
following we present the four procedures in directive 2004/18/EC3, as presented in Figure 21, 
which are built on the principles of transparency, equal treatment and non-discrimination 
(Arrowsmith and Treumer, 2012). However, these principles are gradually weakened for the 
                                                 
3 We will here not describe directive 2004/17/EC which regulates procurement for water, energy, transport and 
postal services sectors. Competitive dialogue was not added to this directive, as procurements covered by these 
regulations can use the negotiated procedure for this. 2004/18/EC also does not cover concessions. 
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more exceptional procedures, which in turn require a higher degree of justification by stringent 
criteria. In addition to the four existing procedures, we will present a procedure which is 
suggested for the new directives to replace 2004/18/EC, called Innovation Partnership (Apostol, 
2012). 
 
Figure 21: Procurement procedures in the EU/EEA 
The open procedure is a straightforward procedure, which starts with an invitation to tender 
(ITT), followed by the reception of tenders and the award to the supplier to score best on the 
award criteria. 
The restricted procedure adds a stage preceding the open procedure, which is the invitation to 
participate (ITP), which allows the contracting authority to shortlist a minimum of five suppliers 
in order to reduce procedural costs. The remaining stages are similar to the open procedure, and 
it does not open for dialogue with the suppliers. 
Competitive dialogue was added to EU directive 2004/18, the current directive on public 
procurement, as there was a need for a procedure that was more flexible than the restricted 
procedure and more transparent than the negotiated procedure. It was in particular constructed 
to accommodate complex procurement projects, including complex ICT projects, where the 
contracting authority does not know the technical specifications of the tender upfront. The 
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competitive dialogue adds a dialogue stage to the process, which takes place after shortlisting a 
minimum of three suppliers. This dialogue stage allows the contracting authority to have separate 
dialogue with each of the qualified candidates. It is also possible to have smaller bidding 
processes throughout the process, followed by new dialogue sessions, in order to improve the 
final bid, which will be similar to that of the open and restricted procedure. 
The negotiated procedure can be considered the most extraordinary procedure, which can only 
be chosen if it is covered by one of the explicit exceptions given in the EU directive. The 
procedure takes two forms, one with notice, and one without. The negotiated procedure with 
notice starts with the ITP, and a shortlisting of minimum three candidates. It is followed by a 
negotiation stage, where the contracting authority negotiates directly with the candidates, until 
they have signed the contract. As such, there is not necessarily a tender process as with the other 
procedures. The negotiated procedure without notice is similar to this, only that prior 
announcement and shortlisting is not necessary, i.e. the contracting authority moves directly to 
negotiation.  
Innovation Partnership is a new procedure suggested for the new EU directive to replace 
directive 2004/18. One problem it aims at addressing is the gap between the pre-commercial 
procurement of R&D services and the ensuing procurement of the products developed. This 
commonly requires a new procurement process, following one of the above-mentioned 
procedures, but with the Innovation Partnership it might become possible to continue with the 
earlier selected partner. However, exactly how this new procedure will be formulated, if included 
at all, has not yet been decided, and as such we will not discuss this further in this study.  
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3.3.3 Relationship 
Håkansson and Snehota (1995, p. 25) describe relationship as “mutually oriented interaction 
between two reciprocally committed parties”, and assign it four structural characteristics 
(continuity, complexity, symmetry, informality) and four process characteristics (adaptations, 
cooperation and conflict, social interaction and routinisation). Without going into detail on these 
characteristics, it is common to draw relationship along a continuum with adversarial arm’s-
length relationships, managed by contract, at one end and close strategic collaboration, managed 
by trust, at the other, where Araujo et al. (1999) observe that there has been a shift in focus 
towards the latter. Cousins et al. (2008) suggest that adversarial relationship are suited for low 
dependency, low risk routine products, while closer collaboration is required for high 
dependency, high risk strategic products.  
While this is a simplification of a more nuanced spectrum of relationships, it is still possible to 
follow the argumentation that procurement for innovation entails risks, and hence closer 
collaboration would be necessary in order to mitigate this risk. A different approach is taken by 
Araujo et al. (1999), who form four interface categories based on the level of interaction between 
the supplier and customer and essentially how much freedom the supplier is given to provide 
own solutions. The interfaces and effects on innovativeness are displayed in Table 7.  
Table 7: Interface categories (Araujo et al., 1999) 
Interface 
category 
Characteristics Customer benefits 
Innovativeness 
Customer costs 
Innovativeness 
Standardised No directions. No 
specific connection 
between user and 
producer contexts. 
None. No direct costs. Allows 
only indirect feedback to 
suppliers based on sales 
figures. 
Specified Precise directions given 
by customer on how to 
produce. 
Minimal (supplier can 
propose changes to 
blueprints). 
Suppliers used as capacity 
reservoir. Development of 
supplier resources may 
suffer. 
Translation Directions given by 
customer based on user 
context and functionality 
required. 
Supplier has some 
leeway to propose 
innovative solutions. 
Supplier may not know 
enough about customer 
context to innovate 
radically 
Interactive Joint development based 
on combined knowledge 
of use and production. 
Supplier learning about 
user context opens up 
the gamut of solutions 
offered. 
Requires investments in 
joint development and 
learning. 
A similar line of thought is found in the field of supplier involvement, where Petersen et al. 
(2005), use the concept of spectrum of supplier integration as shown in Figure 22.  
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Figure 22: Spectrum of supplier integration (Petersen et al., 2005) 
The interaction between user (customer) and producer (supplier) is an important aspect in 
innovation theory (see Lundvall, 1988), which goes together the interactive interface (and to a 
certain degree the translation interface) in the case of Table 7, and the “gray box” in Figure 22. It 
follows that interaction or collaboration between supplier and customer should have a positive 
impact on innovation. We therefore formulate the following supposition: 
Supposition: Procurement for innovation requires strong relationships with suppliers with 
frequent interaction. 
However, collaboration also comes at a cost, and this not only pertains to the costs of investing 
in the relationship. A common implication of close collaboration is the pursuit of a single 
sourcing strategy, as it is too costly, and often not even feasible, to engage in a similar 
relationship with multiple suppliers. The challenge with a single sourcing strategy is that it can 
lead to asymmetric dependency between supplier and customer and result in opportunistic 
behaviour from the supplier - and the lack of competition (see Cousins et al., 2008). As Arlbjørn 
and Freytag (2012) state, the EU directive on public procurement puts a high emphasis on 
procedures that promote a fair and open competition, which suggests a more adversarial 
approach. This is also reflected in the conclusion of a paper by Waluszewski and Wagrell (2013, 
p. 1), who state that “as long as the basic policy foundation is the belief that a supplier-public 
user interaction shall be as close to a traditional market as possible, the ‘thick’ interaction, 
recognised as being critical for renewal of resources, will be seriously limited. We therefore 
formulate the following supposition: 
Supposition: Relationships between the public sector and suppliers are characterised by an 
adversarial arm’s length relationship. 
Combining the suppositions, we arrive at the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: The lack of collaborative relationships with the suppliers is a barrier for public 
procurement for innovation. 
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3.3.4 Culture 
In innovation theory the concept of organisational culture for innovation is often presented as a 
strong driver for innovation (see e.g. Geroski, 1998; Hamel, 1998a; Hamel, 1998b; Kim and 
Mauborgne, 2004). Schlegelmilch et al. (2003, p. 120) summarise it as incorporating a 
“questioning attitude”, while Loewe and Dominiquini (2006, p. 25) describe it as a 
“collaborative, open culture and incentives that reward challenging the status quo”, and 
furthermore argue that mistakes are a “necessary part of innovation”. These concepts are almost 
absent from purchasing literature, although uncertainty and risk in purchasing has been 
addressed (see e.g. Cousins et al., 2008; van Weele, 2005). This raises the discussion as to 
whether purchasing theory can learn something from innovation theory and if procurement for 
innovation requires an organisational culture for innovation. Based on this, we formulate the 
following supposition: 
Supposition: Procurement for innovation requires an organisational culture for innovation. 
Turning more specifically to the public sector, many scholars point to a lack of culture for 
innovation, and in particular to the lack of incentives (see e.g. Albury, 2005; Borins, 2001). Potts 
and Kastelle (2010) argue that the innovation incentive in the public sector is different from in 
the private industry, and point to three main differences: the relationship between policy 
entrepreneurship and policy delivery, the incentive to develop and champion new ideas, and the 
differential contexts of experimentation and failure (see Table 8). Following this, we formulate 
the following supposition: 
Supposition: The public sector does not have a strong culture for innovation.  
Table 8: Differences between private and public innovation. Cited from Potts and Kastelle (2010)  
Private Public 
“Those who back the idea, either financially or 
by working for it, expect due compensation if 
it succeeds but they also carry the risk if it 
fails” 
“When they succeed, the higher echelons take 
the credit; when they fail, lower echelons take 
the blame”  
“A profitable innovation is often observable 
and able to be commensurably rewarded” 
“Absence of feedback of success” 
“Failure is thus an acceptable cost of doing 
business provided that learning occurs” 
 “The down-side losses from risk-taking and 
experimentation are booked by the public 
sector but few up-side benefits are carried 
because of capture” 
Combining the two suppositions we arrive at the following proposition:  
Proposition 4: The lack of culture for innovation is a barrier for public procurement for 
innovation. 
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3.3.5 Knowledge and organisation 
The knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm states that “firms exist as institutions for 
producing goods and services because they can create conditions under which multiple 
individuals can integrate their specialist knowledge” (Grant, 1996, p. 112). An implication of this 
is that the aim of any organisational structure can be viewed as combining the knowledge of 
individuals. This has been used as an argument to move from a vertical functional organisation 
to a horizontal cross-functional organisation. The advantages of cross-functional teams are 
presented both in innovation theory (e.g. Rothwell and Zegveld, 1985), as well as purchasing 
theory (e.g. Cousins et al., 2008). According to Castaldi et al. (2011), internal integration of the 
purchasing function is an element of strategic purchasing, which in turn contributes to 
innovation. This can also be linked to the point of customer sophistication mentioned in 3.1.3, 
where the customer plays an important part in the innovation process. We therefore build the 
following supposition: 
Supposition: Purchase for innovation requires cross-functional organisation. 
While theory describes the use of cross-functional teams in the public sector (see e.g. Piercy et 
al., 2012), and often that more of it is needed, there is no easy saying to what extent cross-
functional organisation is common in the public sector. In the following supposition we assume 
that it is not: 
Supposition: Procurement in the public sector is not organised across functions. 
Putting together the two suppositions, we get the following proposition: 
Proposition 5: The lack of cross-functional organisation is a barrier to public procurement for 
innovation. 
However, purchasing is not only organised across functions, but for larger organisations also 
across layers. Cousins et al. (2008) present a comprehensive comparison of the advantages and 
disadvantages of centralisation and decentralisation4, see Table 9. To overcome some of the 
disadvantages of the two structures, organisations often opt for a hybrid solution, where some 
purchasing is done on local level and some on central level. Despite this, organisations normally 
need to decide upon the degree of centralisation of purchasing. 
This has implications also for innovation, and there is little literature that suggests that either is 
better. As discussed in 3.1.3, economies of scale and standardisation normally have positive 
effects on innovation, and tied to strategic purchasing the possibility of policy deployment is 
                                                 
4 They also present two other structures, atomisation and federalisation, but we will not go into the details of these 
here. 
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important. At the same time extensive centralisation would not take into account the differences 
in demand across the regions, and put distance between the internal customers and the 
purchasing function. However, decentralisation would duplicate skills, and it might be harder 
pool the required knowledge for purchasing for innovation.  
Table 9: Advantages and disadvantages of centralisation and decentralisation. Adapted from Cousins et al. (2008)  
Advantages of centralisation Advantages of decentralisation 
Economies of scale Autonomy 
Standardisation Variety/diversity 
Policy deployment Local prudence 
Financial control Cross-deals 
Auditing and policing Local satisfaction 
Common ICT and systems Inter-divisional competition 
Staff exchange Staff exchange 
  
Disadvantages of centralisation Disadvantages of decentralisation 
Resentment in the regions Suppliers ‘divide and confuse’ 
Bucking the system Cost anomalies 
Missed opportunities Skills shortages/duplication 
‘Overweight’ overheads Lack of financial control 
Slow response Local covert deals 
From the discussion above, we find that there can arguments both for and against centralisation 
in terms of procurement for innovation, but that there are indications that at least a certain 
degree of centralisation is required. This is also in line with one of the four strategies presented 
in 3.1.3, i.e. aggregating demand. As such we formulate the following supposition: 
Supposition: Procurement for innovation requires centralised purchasing. 
As the public sector covers a wide compilation of organisations, we can expect that there are 
examples of both centralised and decentralised organisation. As such, if lack of centralisation is a 
problem, it might not apply everywhere. Nevertheless, to accommodate our search for barriers, 
we will form the supposition that it generally is too decentralised: 
Supposition: Purchasing in the public sector is too decentralised. 
Following these two suppositions, we arrive at the following proposition: 
Proposition 6: The lack of centralised purchasing is a barrier for public procurement for 
innovation. 
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3.4 Overview of the potential barriers 
The theory chapter was introduced by the what, why and how of public procurement for 
innovation, which reveals the complexity of the concept. Next we looked at relevant literature 
that could help describe the drivers to public procurement for innovation. Based on this we 
established five categories, in which we arrived at six possible barriers that we want to examine 
closer. These are: 
P1. The lack of procurement as a strategic function is a barrier for public procurement for 
innovation 
P2. The lack of integration of the innovation process in the purchasing process is a barrier to 
public procurement for innovation. 
P3. The lack of collaborative relationships with the suppliers is a barrier for public 
procurement for innovation. 
P4. The lack of culture for innovation is a barrier for public procurement for innovation. 
P5. The lack of cross-functional organisation is a barrier to public procurement for 
innovation. 
P6. The lack of centralised purchasing is a barrier for public procurement for innovation 
This is also displayed in Figure 23, where the propositions are shown as barriers for the different 
categories that lead to public procurement for innovation. We will return to these propositions in 
chapter 5, when we analyse the empirical data presented in the next chapter. 
 
Figure 23: Potential barriers to public procurement for innovation 
  
   
 
 
51 
 
4 Empirical study 
This chapter (see Figure 24) will start 
with describing the Norwegian 
specialised health services in general, 
as well as innovation, ICT and 
procurement in particular. After this, 
two of the four regional health 
authorities are presented, together 
with two projects for both. This is 
based on the interviews (see 2.2.2). 
4.1 The specialised health services in Norway 
The responsibility to provide healthcare in Norway has been split between the municipalities and 
the state. The municipalities provide primary healthcare through services such as the general 
practitioner scheme (“fastlegeordningen”) and nursing homes. The state, through the ministry of 
health and care services, provides specialised health services, which is the focus of this thesis. 
This is organised in four regional health authorities (RHAs), which in turn are divided into 
hospital trusts (HTs), as displayed in Figure 25. These hospital trusts consist of public hospitals 
and psychiatric institutions, as well as some other institutions (ambulances, rehabilitation, 
laboratories, etc.).  
 
Figure 25: Organisation of specialised health services in Norway 
Ministry of Health and Care Services 
South-Eastern Norway  
Regional Health Authority 
Akershus University HT 
Innlandet HT 
Oslo University HT 
Sunaas HT 
Sørlandet HT 
Telemark HT 
 Vestfold HT 
Vestre Viken HT 
Østfold HT 
Hospital Pharmacies 
Central Norway 
Regional Health Authority  
Møre and Romsdal HT 
Nord-Trøndelag HT 
St. Olav's HT 
Rusbeh. Midt-Norge 
Hospital Pharmacies 
Western Norway  
Regional Health Authority  
Bergen HT 
Fonna HT 
Førde HT 
Stavanger HT 
Hospital Pharmacies 
Northern Norway  
Regional Health Authority 
Finnmark HT 
Helgeland HT 
Nordland HT 
University Hospital of 
North Norway 
Hospital Pharmacies 
Figure 24: Structure of the empirical study 
52 
 
In 2011, the state spent 109 billion NOK on specialised health services (SSB.no, 2012). In the 
South-Eastern Norway RHA one third was spent on procurement of goods and services, 
excluding investments (Eilertsen, 2012), a figure which is likely to be the same in the remaining 
regions. This includes the procurement of health services from private institutions, which in 
2011 was 11 billion NOK, or 10% of the total budget (SSB.no, 2012). 
4.1.1 Innovation in the specialised health services 
In their white paper on innovation, the government emphasises that healthcare should be a 
prioritised sector (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet, 2008-2009). This is rationalised both by 
the magnitude, with public expenditure at 9% of GDP, as well as the need for better services as a 
result of demographic changes in the population. The goal for innovation is stated in the yearly 
mission documents, and further elaborated in an action plan called “Demand-driven innovation 
and industrial development in healthcare” (Helsedirektoratet, 2011). Furthermore, the 
Norwegian Directorate of Health has established a competence network called InnoMed, which 
aims to support the execution of need driven innovation projects, as well as disseminating the 
knowledge gathered in these projects. 
The concept of need driven innovation is separated from innovation based on internal research. 
The latter makes up a large proportion in health services, in the South-Eastern Norway Regional 
Health Authority alone it was 1.7 billion NOK in 2011. This research focuses on the core tasks 
of the hospital trusts, such as medical treatment and biotechnology, and is often connected to 
research communities at the universities. While innovation originating from research might end 
up being commercialised in separate companies, with the help of so-called technology transfer 
offices (such as Inven2 in Oslo and NTNU TTO in Trondheim), the primary characteristic of 
these innovation project is that research and development is done in house. 
This is different to the need or user-driven innovation, which in this case refers both to 
innovation initiated by users inside of the hospital trusts, but also ideas that come from private 
companies. While some of these ideas may also be used as input for in house development, they 
commonly evolve into projects with external actors, where development is done externally. A 
result is that the commercialisation phase requires that the solution is purchased. Therefore, this 
type of innovation is more interesting in terms of public procurement for innovation. 
4.1.2 ICT in the specialised health services 
In their white paper on information and communications technology (ICT) the government lay 
out a digital agenda for Norway in an effort to continue the digitalisation of the public sector in 
order to both gain benefits of improved solutions and to reduce costs of unnecessary paperwork 
(Fornyings- og administrasjonsdepartementet, 2012-2013). Again, the healthcare sector is 
presented as a prioritised sector, due to its size and the impending challenges. The focus is here 
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on care services, and innovative solutions that allow citizens to stay in their homes and take 
control of their health without the need of hospitals and/or manual care labour. However, the 
digitalisation of journal systems is also mentioned. Furthermore, public procurement for 
innovation is explicitly stated as a tool to achieve innovative ICT solutions in healthcare. In the 
mission documents to the regional health authorities, no further directions are given. However, 
the four regional health authorities have developed a plan for a common ICT strategy (Nasjonal 
IKT, 2012). 
In all of the regional health authorities the responsibility of ICT systems, and the purchase 
thereof, has been outsourced to an independent organisation, which remains wholly owned by 
the respective regional health authority. In the South-Eastern RHA this is Sykehuspartner, while 
in the Central RHA it is Hemit, both established in 2003. Hemit runs and maintains 900 servers 
and 14 000 computers, as well as more than 1 000 systems and applications. This illustrates the 
size and complexity of ICT systems in specialised health services.  
A fundamental system in modern hospitals is the Electronic Health Record (EHR) system, 
which collects and displays information about patients for a variety of applications. In the 
Central RHA the system used is Doculive by Siemens, while in the other three regional health 
authorities they have, or plan to, move over to the EHR by DIPS. Over time, these systems have 
become more sophisticated, with a wide range of additional modules, as well as separate systems 
that are integrated with it, although it remains primarily a system that registers data. Examples of 
separate systems that are integrated with EHR are picture archiving and communication systems 
(PACS), which are used to manage pictures taken with medical imaging instruments such as 
digital radiography. Other systems that interact with EHR will be described in the cases below. 
4.1.3 Purchasing in the specialised health services 
In their white paper on public procurement, the government describe how improved purchasing 
can lead to better and more cost effective services, and how it can be used as a policy tool in 
challenges such as the environment, social responsibility, universal design – and innovation 
(Fornyings- og administrasjonsdepartementet, 2008-2009). The focus on innovation was further 
elaborated on in their “Strategy for enhanced innovation effect in public procurement” 
(Departementene, 2013). Towards the regional health authorities this has become part of the 
mission documents, where they are expected to use purchasing as a means to foster innovation. 
As a result of this, the regional health authorities produced a report called “Promote innovation 
and innovative solutions in the specialised health services through public procurement” 
(Nasjonal arbeidsgruppe, 2012). Here functional requirements instead of specific technical 
requirements and increased market dialogue are presented as important aspects.  
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Purchasing in the specialised health services happens on three levels: 1) In the hospital trusts 
(local level), 2) in the regional health authorities (regional level) and 3) on the national level 
through Helseforetakenes Innkjøpsservice (HINAS), an organisation owned by the four regional 
health authorities. Over the past ten years, purchasing has been consolidated and centralised, 
alongside other administrative functions. There have been three developments supporting this. 
Firstly, many standalone hospitals have merged into hospitals trusts. An example of this is the 
merger in 2009 of the four Oslo hospitals to become Oslo Universitetssykehus HT. As such, 
day-to-day purchasing that had previously been conducted in each hospital was moved to the 
new local level of hospital trusts. Secondly, the 2002 hospital reform transferred the 
responsibility of the specialised health services from the counties to the state, resulting in the 
establishment of the regional health agencies and more administrative functions in the regional 
layer. This is also illustrated by the establishment of Hemit and Sykehuspartner in 2003.  
Thirdly, HINAS was established in 2003 to conduct procurement on the national level, and in 
2012 entered agreements for 2.6 billion NOK. The Minister of Health and Care Services has 
pointed to procurement as one of three functions that can be further centralised to the national 
level (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2013). The other two areas are construction and ICT. A 
report on centralisation of state procurement concluded that three dimensions are decisive to 
whether or not to centralise: 1) The degree of standardisation and requirement for 
individual/local adaptation, 2) The possibility to regulate all terms by contract instead of other 
relation, and 3) The relative size of the public procurer in the marked (Oslo Economics et al., 
2011). According to the report, centralisation is suitable when there is a high degree of 
standardisation, the procurement is easily regulated through contract and the state does not 
become a too dominant buyer. 
4.2 South-Eastern Norway Regional Health Authority 
The South-Eastern Norway RHA administers the largest of the four regions, providing health 
services to a population of 2.8 million citizens. Together there are around 150 employees in the 
different administrative functions, including departments for Purchasing & Logistics and 
Research & Development. In addition to this comes Sykehuspartner, who has taken over ICT, 
Human Resources and regional purchasing and logistics. Most of Sykehuspartner’s 1 000 
employees work with ICT, around 40 work with purchasing and logistics. The total amount 
spent on procurement in the region is 20 billion NOK a year. 
Due to an increasing recognition of the significant amount of money spent on purchasing, and 
the fact that it operates in a professional supply market, the purchasing function has received a 
more strategic role – albeit slowly. To a larger degree, procurement is used to fulfil strategic 
decisions, such as finding regional ICT solutions, and made with a long-term perspective, where 
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the focus is on quality and total cost of ownership. An assessment made by McKinsey is that the 
procurement function today is in the “second generation”, where procurement still remains 
primarily a support function. In their procurement strategy for 2013-2016, the aim is to get to 
the fourth and final generation, which is a fully strategic procurement function (Helse Sør-Øst 
RHF, 2013). According to Kjetil Istad, director of purchasing and logistics in the South-Eastern 
Norway RHA, there is a clear relation between making procurement more strategic and 
procurement for innovation. At the same time, he argues, radical innovation is seldom achieved 
through traditional commercial procurement, but rather in development projects in the pre-
commercial procurement phase. 
The focus on pre-commercial procurement is currently strong in the South-Eastern Norway 
RHA. One reason is the general attention the concept receives in the public sector through 
Europe; another is the cooperation between Istad and Bjørn Grønli, the head of innovation in 
the South-Eastern Norway RHA. A common problem they have experienced is the procurement 
of large ICT solutions, that later turned out not to meet expectations. Instead, they find there 
should be pre-commercial stage with piloting beforehand, with the possibility of proceeding with 
a scaled commercial procurement or not. This pre-commercial procurement is modelled after the 
European Commission, which also promotes the use of competition throughout the stages. 
However, here it becomes important who initiates the pre-commercial innovation project. 
According to Morten Andresen, founder of Imatis, when they come with an idea, they do not 
accept that the idea is taken and announced in a competition. If that happens, they walk away 
from the project. 
Regulations are also a hot topic in terms of market dialogue and early market involvement, where 
historically procurers have been too cautious in interacting with the suppliers, in fear of violating 
the rules of non-discrimination. This has been fuelled by a significant amount of cases submitted 
by suppliers to the KOFA (Norwegian Complaints Board for Public Procurement). As such, 
many have developed risk aversion, where the main objective is not to get complaints afterwards. 
However, according to Istad it is fully possible to have dialogue with the suppliers and still 
follow the regulations, as long as it is done properly. In his opinion, dialogue is not only 
important for procurement for innovation, but for procurement in general.  
Another challenge is capacity. Early market involvement requires time and resources, both 
scarce. Istad suspects that many procurers still begin the procurement process too late, create the 
specifications without interaction with the supplier, and often end up with too detailed 
specifications. Today, procurers in the South-Eastern region use more time on the early phases, 
such as organising supplier conferences, but Istad considers there is still potential to improve on 
that. Despite the fact that market interaction is increasing, the number of KOFA cases has been 
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reduced. This should, however, also be seen in connection with a significant increase in the fee 
for complaints. In addition to more early involvement, the South-Eastern Norway RHA have 
established own teams to follow up entered agreements, as well as keeping steady relations with 
the larger suppliers. 
Traditionally procurement in the South-Eastern Norway RHA has been very fragmented, 
commonly in each hospital. This has made it harder to have the competence building required to 
conduct good procurements. The consolidation into hospital trusts has made it less fragmented, 
and in the case of the South-Eastern region, much has also been elevated to the regional level. 
Not only has this been necessary for competence building, but also in order to link purchases to 
regional strategic decisions. This is particularly true organisational changes, which are often 
accompanied with innovative solutions. In many cases, however, this regionalisation has been 
recent development. For example ICT system were often purchased on a local level, which 
means that different health trusts within the South-Eastern region have different systems, and in 
some cases even within the health trusts. It is only recently that the regional health authority 
decided to go for one single EHR system for the whole region. 
To help combat the problem of distance to the users, the regional health authority has 
established product councils, which are groups consisting of clinicians from the different 
hospitals within a specific department. These meet with the purchasers once a month, and for 
procurement projects some of them are selected to form the project team. According to Istad, 
this arrangement has been successful in ensuring integration of operations. 
A problem found with the different layers of procurement is that the supplier does not always 
know where to “enter” the system. In many cases they will go to the health trusts to present their 
ideas, while it may in fact be more correct to address the regional health authority. Another 
problem can be that the suppliers are too small. While innovation often resides in the small and 
medium sized enterprises, procurement in the South-Eastern region often experience that they 
come with too small solutions, instead of complete packages. The latter is preferred in order to 
reduce the supply base. In addition, the companies are often fragile in terms of economic 
strength, where the procurers have to assess whether it will be able to supply. The suggestion 
from Grønli is for suppliers to go together to offer a complete package. This has worked well for 
Imatis on several occasions (see also 4.3.2), when large and small suppliers have gone together to 
supplement each other. However Andresen finds that it is a challenge to cooperate only with 
small suppliers, with Imatis being relatively small itself, and that such a network commonly do 
not become sufficiently competitive. 
In the following we will describe two projects in the South-Eastern Norway RHA. The first is 
Seekuence Medical, the result of an innovation project, which is now struggling to reach the 
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phase of commercialised procurement. The second is MetaVision, a procurement project that 
has required product development, as well as changes in the work processes. 
4.2.1 Seekuence Medical 
Seekuence Medical is a product for video documentation of surgery and examination. It is a tool 
designed to efficiently bookmark, store and retrieve important and interesting events out of the 
often enormous video amount produced during surgery and examination. Afterwards the 
bookmarked events may easily be edited, commented or reported to an EHR system.  
The history of Seekuence Medical (see Table 10) 
starts with a product with similar concept. The 
product, called Posicap Sport, is a software solution 
that allows trainers to instantly tag important 
happenings in video recordings, which makes it 
more efficient to find these sequences later on. It 
was developed in 2000 and sold to the Norwegian 
School of Sport Sciences for the use in football 
matches. Later it was also sold to other countries.  
More by coincidence some physicians from Sykehuset Buskerud participated in a meeting in 
2007, where Posicom presented their product. The physicians suggested that the same 
functionality would be useful in operations, which could take hours and it would be useful to 
easily be able to go back to specific sequences. Posicom evaluated the possibility to enter the 
healthcare sector, and through market research concluded that such a product did not yet exist, 
and that there was a market for it. 
Posicom initiated a pre-study with Sykehuset Buskerud, with the financial support of Innovation 
Norway, a public organisation working to promote innovative solutions. The results of the pre-
study were positive, and Sykehuset Buskerud and Posicom started a development project in 
2008, with the financial support of Innovation Norway. However, the project got a late start, as 
Sykehuset Buskerud was not ready. One reason for this was that the hospital changed name to 
Drammen Sykehus and was consolidated with other hospitals into Vestre Viken HT.  
The development project started in the latter part of 2009, and required further development of 
the Posicap system, among other ensuring better security and multiple users. Posicom was 
frustrated that the process was slow and had the opinion that Vestre Viken HT needed to 
dedicate more resources to the project, instead of letting clinicians work with testing and 
feedback on top of their operational tasks. In addition to this, Vestre Viken HT moved over to a 
new EHR system, DIPS, which was not the system that Seekuence Medical originally was set out 
Table 10: Process of Seekuence Medical 
2000 Development of Posicap Sport 
2007 Initial dialogue 
2008 Development contract entered 
2009 Development starts 
2011 Development ends, but 
product not completely 
integrated 
2013 Decision to integrate the 
product with DIPS 
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to be integrated with. The integration was the responsibility of Vestre Viken, but when the 
development project ended in 2011 and there were no funds left, the product was not yet 
integrated. 
One of the challenges experienced by Posicom during the development of Seekuence Medical 
has been the lack of dedicated personnel involved from the hospital. Enthusiasts have done a lot 
of the project work at evenings as an additional work assignment, resulting in a development 
process with hampered progress. According to Harald Noddeland, manager of pre-hospital 
services at Vestre Viken, there are a lot of creative and inventive personnel at the hospital, but 
they are restricted by requirements of operating as efficiently as possible. Therefore, activities 
beyond daily operational tasks that do not result in immediate value are neglected. Noddeland 
reasons that innovation projects are not profitable within strongly pressured and short-term 
oriented budgets. Resources available to health services are scarce, and budget constraints with 
short-term perspectives are hindering investments in innovation with potential financial gain in 
the future. For the health services it is more important with liquidity this year or the next than a 
potential reward over a ten-year period. Additionally, Noddeland claims that the increase in 
service quality is not a strong enough incentive and that Vestre Viken requires monetary rewards 
with immediate effect on the bottom line. The consequences of budget constraints further affect 
Seekuence Medical, as video processing is not part of a life threatening operation at the hospital. 
Noddeland explains that scarce resources will be allocated according to the degree of necessity 
for life threatening tasks rather than to fund the development of video processing.  
At the time that the funds from Innovation Norway were used up, the delay caused throughout 
the development stage had resulted in a prototype that was still not integrated with the EHR 
system. In addition to this delay, by which the innovation project never was completely finished, 
there was no further plan for scaled piloting, to see if the prototype worked in different 
departments. This has been problematic, as neither Vestre Viken nor other hospital trusts would 
risk procuring a product that has not been properly tested and evaluated in scale. In spring 2013, 
Vestre Viken decided that it would use of its own money to finance the integration with DIPS, 
and to make use of it in a number different departments (without reaching a scale that required a 
tendering process). Following this it can be that Vestre Viken or other hospital trusts decide to 
procure solutions with such functionality, in which case Seekuence Medical would have a strong 
position, both as few competitors can offer this, and because they would be able to show that it 
already works. 
There are two reasons for why Vestre Viken now is willing to spend from their own budget, 
while initially more cautious. Firstly, the preliminary assessment of the innovation project, 
although it was not completely finished, were positive and it was possible to see how the product 
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would improve the clinical work. Secondly, Vestre Viken is now less occupied with the 
consolidation process and migration to DIPS, which had taken up much resources. Nevertheless, 
in the opinion of Noddeland, it would have been better if there were a funding structure that did 
not stop with the prototype or small-scale pilot, but which made it possible to have a pilot 
sufficiently in scale to have a proper evaluation phase. This should come either from Innovation 
Norway, or alternatively from the regional health authority. Without such financial support it has 
taken time to find the funding for the rest of the project. 
4.2.2 MetaVision 
MetaVision is a system dedicated to digitalising the chart functionality of EHR. Documents 
containing “chart functions” – graphical visualisation of clinical patient information as a function 
of time – constitute a large share of the remaining paper-based work processes related to patient 
journals, and digitalising chart functionality is one of the biggest remaining challenges of creating 
electronic health records. In addition to visualisation of charts, MetaVision will act as a 
medication and planning tool, and the system is developed by the software company iMDsoft. 
Furthermore, it is used to facilitate a continuous patient care and to share patient data across all 
units during the patient care. By streamlining workflow and documentation, MetaVision aims to 
increase patient safety through focusing on both the present and planning of patient observation 
and medication in addition to acting as decision-support for clinical staff.  
The first inquiry for such a system at South-Eastern 
Norway RHA was made in July 2006 (see Table 11), 
i.e. two years after a similar inquiry in the Central 
Norway RHA (a process further described in 4.3.1). 
This was done on a local level, first by Rikshospitalet 
and Ullevål Universitetssykehus, which later became 
part of Oslo Universitetssykehus HT, and resulted in 
a contract with iMDsoft. Akershus University HT did 
the same, although at this time there was no regional 
coordination for the implementation between the 
different health trusts. A result of this was among 
other that the different hospitals configured the 
system differently. Until 2009 MetaVision was 
installed in 65 places, and this period also required 
training of clinicians as well as improvements of the 
original product.  
2006 Local procurement 
2007 Started work on regional 
framework agreement 
2007 Tendering process 
2008 Tender won by iMDsoft 
2008 Entered into framework 
agreement  
2010 Specification 
2010/2011 Design, configuration, 
test 
2011 Piloting 
2011 Scaling up 
2014 
(expected) 
Piloting at Østfold HT 
2014 
(expected) 
New framework 
agreement 
Table 11: Process of MetaVision 
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At the end of 2007 South-Eastern Norway RHA decided to make a framework agreement that 
would direct the system used for digitalisation of chart functionality by the hospital trusts in the 
region. Using resources from the relevant clinical operations, a specification set containing 
around thousand specifications was written. The chosen procurement procedure was the 
negotiated procedure with notification. After the invitation to participate six suppliers qualified. 
These made a presentation, after which the South-Eastern Norway RHA went into negotiation 
with three. The negotiation essentially took the form of a case, where the suppliers had to show 
how their systems fulfilled the different specifications by showing how it would look like with 
dummy patients. Following these solutions, it was possible for the South-Eastern Norway RHA 
to see how many of the thousand specifications were fulfilled, and how many would need to be 
developed or should be discarded. Through further negotiation, the solution that was chosen 
was iMDsoft’s MetaVision. In the contract entered provisions were made for how development 
of functionality not yet existing should take place and when it should be delivered. However, 
Noddeland finds that it was a mistake to enter it as a framework agreement that was not binding 
for all health trusts, as it increased the uncertainty for the supplier and made the threshold higher 
for the health trusts that did decide to use the system, as they would have to contribute to the 
development costs. This was later solved by making it mandatory for all health trusts to support 
the development costs, whether they chose to use the system or not.  
After tendering, the resources available to development of a chart solution for all health trusts in 
South-Eastern Norway RHA were aggregated in a regional project organisation, and Oslo 
Universitetssykehus became the pilot hospital. However, the design review board had 
participants from all health trusts. Furthermore, the project was divided into two core solutions. 
The first concerned surgery and intensive care, and this core solution has been through 
specification, design, configuration and testing, and piloting started in the first quarter of 2011. 
The second core solution concerned general ward, emergency and outpatient clinic. This solution 
performed specification in 2010, before design, configuration, testing and piloting in 2011.  
The implementation of MetaVision has required a considerable amount of modification and 
development. In addition, the implementation process has included comprehensive demands 
regarding standardisation within the region. According to Andreas Grønbekk, project manager 
of the regional chart and medication project in South-Eastern Norway RHA, the standardisation 
has taken the form of unexpected additional work, but parameter definitions are necessary as a 
foundation for the implementation process. Grønbekk illustrates this process by describing how 
there previously were 320 different chart solutions at general wards in the region. Furthermore, 
MetaVision lacks functionality for the whole organisation and compatibility across hospital 
departments such as intensive care, general ward surgery remains to be implemented. 
Consequently, a lot of the development has been related to the complexity of a larger hospital, 
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and much work is put into making a continuous chart independent of location and time. 
Grønbekk explains that chart functionality of medication is especially challenging, as medicating 
a patient is tightly connected across hospital departments. Previously there has been a lot of 
malfunction related to real-time issues and information loss during cross-department transitions, 
and improving within these areas has proven to be both challenging and time-costly.  
Currently, MetaVision is scheduled for a new pilot at Østfold HT in 2014. As the old framework 
agreement has expired and is not suitable for this new situation, a new framework agreement 
with related tendering is also scheduled for 2014. Based on the experiences obtained from the 
present implementation, South-Eastern Norway RHA is preparing the tender process by 
establishing requirements through wanted qualities rather than requirement specification. The 
qualities will be system independent and unrelated to previous solutions, and this is in contrast to 
the previous tender. The aim is to generate specific requirements during the tendering process, 
and not in advance. Grønbekk suspects that applying this approach on the previous tender 
would have been beneficial in order to be more efficient in the subsequent development and 
improvement process. Still, he realises that it would have been difficult; as experiences obtained 
from the current regional framework agreement is a prerequisite for the modified approach.  
According to Noddeland, the time frame of six years (4+1+1) had not been sufficiently long to 
capture the required length of the project, and a new framework agreement would be an 
unnecessary obstacle at best. As he sees it, such a project is a large investment from the regional 
health authority, both in terms of organisational changes, but also in the solution of the supplier. 
As such it would not make sense to switch supplier every six years. Grønbekk agrees with this, 
but at the same time finds that being forced to reconsider existing solutions and suppliers 
occasionally could also be useful in order not to get stuck with an inferior product.  
4.3 Central Norway Regional Health Authority 
The Central Norway RHA administers the central region of Norway, providing services to 
around 700 000 inhabitants spread over three counties (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2010). 
The region has 15 procurers, three in the regional health authority and the remaining in the three 
health trusts, as well as one in Hemit. The total amount spent on procurement in the region is 5 
billion NOK per year. 
While there is a plan to make the procurement function more strategic, according to Bård Skage, 
head of procurement in the Central Norway RHA, the procurement function is still relatively far 
from becoming strategic. He gives several reasons for this. One is simply the lack of labour, 
illustrated by the 15 procurers in the Central region compared to 130 in the South-Eastern 
region. The consequence is that they have to prioritise urgent operational tasks, such as ensuring 
that there are agreements for all product groups, on behalf of more long-term strategic matters, 
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such as competence building and procurement planning. However, Skage argues, it is not as 
simple as employing more procurers either. It is hard to find good candidates, who are 
knowledgeable both of purchasing in general, as well as the particularities of public procurement, 
and who furthermore have an understanding of the health sector. Furthermore, Skage sees 
restrictions in the organisational structure, which he considers another impediment towards 
making the procurement function more strategic. 
The organisation of procurement in the health region follows what they have called a network 
structure, where each health trust has a procurement department, which is connected to the 
procurement department in the regional health authority. There is a mutual understanding in the 
network, led by Skage, that regional procurement in many cases will be a beneficial arrangement, 
and a binding agreement that resources are allocated to these projects. However, as the procurers 
in the health trusts are employed by the health trusts, there can also be conflicts of interest, for 
example when an urgent local procurement is prioritised. This could, Skage argues, be solved by 
moving towards a more centralised line structure, where procurers are moved to a regional unit, 
similar to Sykehuspartner in the South-Eastern region. It would not necessarily remove all the 
procurers from the health trusts, but move the centre of gravity to the region. Another step in 
this direction would be to elevate the regional purchasing function from a department under 
department under the director of administration and project management to an executive 
function of its own.  
The proposed shift towards a regional organisation of procurement follows a trend of more 
products being procured regionally. Roger Presthus, account manager in Hemit, is certain that 
such centralisation is the right way to go, especially for ICT solutions that require specific 
procurement competence, such as about change processes. As such, centralisation is a necessity 
for building competence. Skage also maintains that it would be easier to build competence with 
more control over the procurers. He is not too concerned that this would take away the 
autonomy of the health trusts, and argues that there is still enough freedom for local adaptation. 
He does, however, see that not all products are suitable for centralisation, whether from local to 
regional level, or the next step to national level. In his experience it is easy to do when the 
operational department is clearly defined and the product is relatively standardised. For ICT 
hardware there is already several national framework agreements, and also ICT services should 
be possible to move to the national level. However, he is more cautious towards complex ICT 
systems, describing failed efforts to procure a nationwide logistics and finance system. If the 
health services in Norway cannot agree on systems for the support functions, he asks 
rhetorically, how can they then adopt common clinical information systems. 
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An important prerequisite for moving procurement to the regional and national level, is, 
according to Skage, standardisation. Standardised treatment processes across hospitals lead to 
standardised products, which makes it possible to centralise procurement. This is the role of 
operations, he maintains, e.g. orthopaedic surgeons in different hospitals have to agree what 
requirements they have for hip replacements. This has proven to be a challenging task, as 
clinicians want to focus on their core activity, treatment of patients, and often do not have the 
time to work on standardisation and take part in procurement projects. As such, Skage explains, 
too much time is spent on establishing the projects, and getting the right resources for the team. 
Sometimes the procurement has stopped completely because of this. In his opinion, 
procurement must be a more prominent part of the managerial responsibility at the different 
departments, and there has to be an understanding of the role procurement has in the treatment 
of patients, so that the necessary resources are provided for the projects. Because, as he points 
out, everyone can feel it if the products are not in place. To get a stronger involvement from 
operations, they are considering to establish product councils similar to those in the South-
Eastern region. 
According to Skage, it is the clinical operations who has the ownership of what is being 
procured, and who decides what the demand should be. When talking about public procurement 
for innovation, he argues, it is rather operations who have to decide if they want to have 
something new. The role the procurement function is to lead the process, and to ask the right 
questions. In the procurement handbook for the region there is a checklist for points to 
consider, such as issues regarding the environment and ethical procurement. Innovation is also 
mentioned, although without further guidelines on how to induce innovation through 
procurement. 
In terms of interaction with the market, Skage finds that they have not been good enough at 
making a proper market analysis, pointing to a combination of lack of resources, competence 
and time. While it is important to control the dialogue through the official procurement process, 
where there is commonly a single point of contact, he thinks that much more can be done in the 
planning stage. As long as non-discrimination is ensured, he is very positive to more dialogue 
with the market, such as organising supplier conferences and other arenas where operations can 
meet the suppliers for dialogue. However, so far this has not be done extensively. One problem, 
Skage finds, is that procurers have been afraid of interacting with the suppliers. He does not 
attribute this so much regulation as to reputation, and the consequences of making mistakes. The 
result is that procures are more interested in doing the process right, instead of what gives the 
best product. The focus on minimising risk and avoiding finger pointing, he reasons, does not go 
well with thinking innovation. However, he does find that there has been a small change lately, 
which may lead to a less risk adverse culture. 
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In the following we will look at two projects that took place in the Central Norway health region. 
The first is e-kurve, a procurement project that has brought with it a significant amount of 
development. The second is Imatis Mobilix, which was part of a large contract awarded to 
Telenor for the construction of a new hospital in St. Olav’s HT. This part will also include 
reflections on other projects done by Imatis. 
4.3.1 E-kurve 
E-kurve is a clinical information system for the general hospital wards, which is supposed to 
meet three demands identified by operations in the hospitals in Central Norway. The first 
demand was a system that would display data of the patients, such as observations, assessments 
and history of treatments. This was called “kurve” or chart, deriving from chart functions that 
were used to visualise the observations. The second demand (“medisin”) was a tool that would 
make it possible to manage the medication given throughout the hospitalisation. The third 
demand (“forordning”) was a tool to plan and book observations and treatments of the patients 
from the different departments in the hospital. 
These three demands were requested separately 
when Hemit put up a request for dialogue and pre-
qualification in July 2004 (see Table 12). In 
addition they requested a clinical information 
system on anaesthesia and intensive care, as well as 
one for maternity wards. An important aspect of 
the procurement was that the systems should be 
integrated both with each other and with existing 
systems at the hospital, such as Doculive, the EHR 
system in the region. 
Hemit decided to use what today would have gone 
under the name of competitive procedure, instead 
of the common open procedure, as it was not 
possible for them to settle the detailed specifications of the requirements in the beginning. A first 
meeting with eight qualified suppliers was held in August, where the process was explained. In 
the first period, however, the overall functional requirements were outlined internally in the 
Central Norway health region, i.e. between Hemit and the operations in the hospitals. This 
resulted in a draft of the specifications, which was used for the dialogue with the potential 
suppliers in October and November. The specifications were then adapted to a final versions, 
and tenders were submitted in December. 
2004  
 - July Request for dialogue 
 - August Initial dialogue 
 - September Draft of specifications 
 - October Input from suppliers 
 - November Final specifications 
 - December Tenders submitted 
2005 Spring Contract entered 
2005 Development and 
clarification of contract 
2007-2008 Test version 
2009-2010 First piloting session 
2012-2013 Second piloting session 
2013-2014 Possible deployment 
Table 12: Process of e-kurve 
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Throughout the process it became clear that three of the demands were so closely linked to each 
other that it should be considered one system. This was called Kurve-Medisin-Forordning 
(KMF), which later became the name e-kurve. Siemens won this tender, which required new 
product development, as well as for anaesthesia and intensive care, for which they already had an 
existing system, PICIS. Siemens had had a long history of supplying to hospitals in Central 
Norway, through the EHR system Doculive. The last system, which was similar to the other but 
specifically for maternity wards, was awarded to Cardiac (later Imatis), who developed a product 
later named Natus. The contracts were signed in spring 2005. 
Siemens started developing the system, and the first test version of the e-kurve system came in 
2007-2008, but turned out to be quite different to what the clinicians actually needed. In part this 
was because the clinicians did not manage to articulate what they needed. Another challenge was 
the different perceptions of integration. The requirement had been that the system “should be 
integrated with…”, but this was very vague, and it required significant efforts from both sides to 
clarify the contract. Integration turned out to be considerably more complex than initially 
anticipated. The first piloting session took place in 2009-2010, but revealed that further 
development was still needed. Perhaps more importantly, it became more and more apparent 
that in addition introducing a new system to the hospitals, it would also change the work 
processes, and process changes were required to move from the paper-based system to the 
digital systems.  
A second piloting session was initiated in 2012, and the current plan is to start full deployment in 
the end of 2013. This however depends on the evaluation of the pilots, where the preliminary 
response appears divided. Some are very content with the system and want to have it deployed 
throughout the whole hospital trust. Others are more cautious, and find that the system still does 
not cover all the functionality required. In addition to the evaluation, the Central Norway RHA 
has to make a decision as to whether they should stay with their current EHR system, Doculive, 
or move over to DIPS, as the rest of the health regions. This decision could also impact the 
future of e-kurve, which is currently integrated with Doculive. 
The specifications that were developed in 2004, which were used for the supervision of the 
contracts, failed to encapsulate the complexity and uncertainty of the systems. Looking back, 
Roger Presthus, at the time project leader for the procurement of e-kurve, sees that more 
interaction and a stepwise progress would have been needed. It was naïve, he argues, to assume 
that the requirements specified in 2004 captured demand well enough. Instead there should have 
been a much longer period before the formal procurement started, with dialogue conferences 
and interaction with the suppliers. There had been some, but it was not sufficient. It would have 
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been better, Presthus maintains, to run it as a development project much further, instead of 
locking the specifications so early. 
One of the challenges in capturing the demand has to do with the collaboration between Hemit 
and the operational units. When the first prototype was presented, the physicians claimed that 
they had not been involved, while other physicians had in fact been involved when making the 
specifications. The problem, Presthus explains, is that physicians are a heterogeneous group, who 
like to represent themselves, but not physicians in the health trust as a whole, and especially not 
throughout the region. In addition to this, it is hard to motivate physicians and other clinicians to 
prioritise working on procurement projects, while they also have to work on operational tasks. A 
possibility is for clinicians to take a complete break from clinical work in order to contribute to 
large procurement projects, but here it is both hard to find the funding and the willingness 
among the employees. 
Another problem with locking specifications early is that they are likely to describe a solution 
that supports the current work processes, as opposed to how the work processes should actually 
be. Presthus explains that most of the time they have used on e-kurve has been on improving the 
work processes in the clinical operations, so that they can actually use new ICT tools that 
support such processes, and adds that “You think you are going to implement an ICT solution, 
but you actually carry out a gigantic transformation process”. This awareness did not exist at the 
time that e-kurve was procured, but is improving. Now, Hemit has employed three change 
managers, who help with the change processes in the health trusts. This includes preparing the 
users for what is to come, but also to get the necessary management commitment to implement 
it. An important prerequisite to all of this is to standardise processes, such as the course of a 
treatment, across the departments and health trusts. According to Presthus, the Central Norway 
RHA should become stricter on demanding and enforcing such standardisation in the various 
clinical areas.  
If he would have carried out the same procurement again, Presthus explains that he would have 
asked for funding to use much more time on the first part of the procurement process, and 
spend more time on market dialogue. One possibility could have been to ask some suppliers to 
make a prototype, both to learn more about the solution and to see if the suppliers are capable. 
As such, the first goal would not have been to create the technical specifications, but instead to 
learn more about own demand and what the market can deliver. This would also postpone the 
choice of supplier to a latter point, where it might be clearer what the award criteria should be. 
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4.3.2 Mobilix 
Imatis Mobilix is a software solution initially developed in 2004 by Cardiac (later Imatis) for the 
new hospital buildings of St. Olav’s HT in Trondheim. The idea behind Mobilix is to simplify 
logistical operations by replacing fixed communication points with mobile communication. The 
solution consists of an underlying system, a messaging server that handles the different devices 
that need to communicate with each other. These are primarily Cisco wireless IP phones, which 
have software installed that allow clinicians to log onto the common network. The clinician 
chooses a role, which in turn gives him/her a responsibility, for example for a certain section. If 
a patient in a ward in that section pulls the cord, this clinician will get this signal directly to the 
phone, instead of having to be near a screen to receive the signal. The Mobilix system is used for 
all types of messaging, for the clinicians, staff transporting the patients, and so on. All in all, the 
system has 5 000 to 6 000 users and around 100 000 messages are sent through the system every 
day. 
The construction of the new university hospital in Trondheim is an enormous project, with a 
budget of roughly 12 billion NOK to build an area of 200 000 square metres in the period of 
2002-2013. One part of the project is the ICT infrastructure, for which Helsebygg Midt-Norge in 
July 2003 issued an open call for tenders, and which was awarded to Telenor in January 2004. 
Ementor, one of the competitors, filed a complaint to KOFA and won, but no new tendering 
process was initiated. The contract was signed in February 2004, amounting to 335 million NOK 
for the period of 2004 to 2006. Telenor also won the consecutive contract for 2007 to 2009, 
signing a new contract in January 2007 worth 360 million NOK. Together with maintenance, the 
whole contract was estimated at around 1 billion NOK.  
Telenor became the role as turnkey contractor, by which it was responsible for designing, project 
planning, delivery, implementation and training for the entire ICT infrastructure. Subcontractors 
included HP, Cisco and Cardiac. Cardiac was a small Norway based ICT company, which had 
delivered ICT solutions to the petroleum industry since the early 1990s. This was their first step 
into the healthcare sector, which was made possible by the fact that they had references of 
similar systems working on a large scale in the petroleum industry. Telenor needed their 
competence, and they entered a partnership for the delivery to St. Olav’s HT. The health care 
part of Cardiac was later established as a separate company, called Imatis. 
Imatis developed the Mobilix, building on the platform they had delivered to the petroleum 
industry, and delivered it to the first hospital building in 2005. As more buildings were 
constructed, the solution was installed in more places. The deployment of Mobilix was 
successful, and there were no major problems with the delivery from Imatis. However, there 
were weaknesses with the IP phones by Cisco, as well as network problems, both affecting the 
68 
 
usability of Mobilix. Because of these problems, although they were fixed, the hospital also did 
not rely on the system for life-critical situations, and they decided that emergency signals should 
still go to the pager of the physician currently on duty and not the wireless IP phone. 
The delivery to St. Olav’s HT was important for Imatis, who now had a reference in the 
healthcare sector, and decided to pursue the market further. They have won several large 
contracts, both abroad and in Norway. In many cases they deliver to newly constructed hospitals, 
and they frequently partner up with larger corporations, such as HP and telecom companies. 
This has seemingly worked better than partaking in more specific procurement projects, which 
used to have overly detailed specifications. An example is the delivery of Natus to the Central 
Norway RHA, which had more than 5 000 specifications, compared to the 200 in the 
significantly larger delivery to St. Olav’s HT. Andresen notes that it was impossible to come up 
with any smart solutions, as specifications were “almost given for every single button, defining 
the colour, what it should say on the button, and where on the screen it should be placed”. As 
such, even though a new product was required, the customer had already set clear directions for 
the development. Presthus, who followed the procurement from Hemit, agrees that this was too 
specified. According to Andresen, the customer must stick with functional requirements and give 
the suppliers the freedom to find the right solutions. While health authorities have improved in 
the latter years, Imatis still encounters situations with too specified requirements. 
Imatis has experienced that it is hard to take part in a normal procurement process with new 
ideas, as it is often necessary with prior references just to be qualified. The hospitals are reluctant 
to purchase unless someone has done it before. Andresen describes innovation projects an 
alternative way in, where they take their ideas to hospitals and start projects with the financing of 
Innovation Norway, through this creating the necessary references for procurement. Here, 
Andresen finds that there are significant differences between Norway and a large innovation 
project Imatis had together with the regional health authority of Zealand, Denmark.  
The innovation project in Denmark consisted of pilots in 15-20 departments in the whole region. 
While first reluctant, Imatis convinced Innovation Norway that such a scale was necessary in 
order to test collaboration across departments and hospitals in the region. The project was set up 
with a steering committee and decision gates, so that it was evaluated along the way. However, 
the progress was so successful that some of the decision gates were skipped. In parallel to the 
development of the ICT solution, a lean project was running, to see how to make the required 
organisational changes following the new solution. The innovation project was a success, and 
made it possible for the regional health authority to close two of six emergency departments. 
When they later issued a call for tenders in order to purchase the solution for all departments, 
Imatis was the only possible supplier. 
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Funding for the project was ensured for the complete large scale pilot from the very beginning, 
with 17 million NOK invested by the regional health authority, 6 million NOK coming from 
Innovation Norway and 5 million NOK from Imatis. This allowed them to have a full time 
project leader, as well as freeing the time of clinicians required in the project. This contrasts to 
the Imatis’ experience in Norway, where projects often rely heavily on the limited funds by 
Innovation Norway, and the participation in the project is something that comes on top of the 
day-to-day work of the clinicians, which in turn slows down the whole project. However, 
Andresen also sees that the Norwegian health regions are learning from the Danish model, and 
they are currently involved in two innovation projects that follow a similar structure. 
Nevertheless, Andresen experiences reluctance in Norwegian hospitals for long term 
investments, such as in innovation, for several reasons. One is that the reward system is built up 
around the yearly budgets, i.e. a physician is measured on what is gained in that year, and not 
what might be gained in five years. Furthermore, the hospitals do not always see the gain of the 
solutions, as they do not measure the impact. This contrasts to the project in Denmark, where an 
evaluation resulted in the reduction of departments and consequent cost savings. Another 
problem is that many hospitals struggle with their finances, in several cases running a deficit, 
which forces them to focus on short term challenges. While the regional level gives a lot of 
attention to innovation, it gets lost on the way to the local level, where hospitals are busy 
firefighting. According to Andresen the hospitals need to balance their budget, and then ensure 
that part of the budget is allocated to innovation projects, claiming that commitment will only 
take place if they have to use their own money. It should also be considered to take some of the 
money allocated to innovation in Innovation Norway, and give it directly to the budgets of the 
health thrusts. Lastly, Andresen suggests to focus on fewer projects and ensure proper 
commitment, instead of having many small projects without proper ownership, as he experiences 
is the case now. 
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5  Analysis 
In this chapter we will analyse the empirical data we collected against the six propositions we 
formulated in the theoretical chapter. An overview this is shown in Table 13. Rather than a 
summary of the analysis, the table provides a description following the different propositions. It 
also illustrates some challenges in doing a proper cross-case analysis. First, for some propositions 
we will primarily look at the regional health authorities, while for others the project – and in 
most cases we will try to combine the two. Secondly, our analysis is not so much comparative, 
searching for best practice and compare the different projects against this, as it is finding 
evidence and underlying reason for the different propositions in different places as one project 
or regional health authority alone is not sufficient for this. 
Table 13: Overview of cross-case analysis 
 South-Eastern Norway RHA Central Norway RHA 
 Seekuence Medical MetaVision E-kurve Mobilix 
Procurement 
as a strategic 
function 
Procurement becoming more long-
term and strategic, but still not entirely 
focused on value-for-money and 
contributor to overall strategy. 
Procurement generally not strategic, 
focus is primarily on short-term 
operational tasks. The aim is to make 
it more strategic.  
Integration of 
the 
innovation 
process 
Primarily an 
innovation project, 
without a plan for 
commercial 
procurement. 
Innovation took 
place after 
contract for 
commercial 
procurement. 
Innovation 
took place after 
contract for 
commercial 
procurement. 
Innovation took 
place after contract 
for commercial 
procurement. 
Collaborative 
relationship 
Interaction in all 
stages, but delayed 
due to lack of 
available clinicians. 
Specifications 
done without 
supplier, but 
negotiations. 
Contract 
specifies what to 
develop. 
Specifications 
made in 
dialogue with 
suppliers. 
Contract 
specifies what 
to develop. 
Specifications 
done without 
supplier, but 
primarily 
functional 
requirements. 
Contract less 
detailed. 
Culture for 
innovation 
Historically procurers have been afraid 
of making mistakes. Improving, but 
still a challenge. 
Historically procurers have been 
afraid of making mistakes. 
Improving, but still a challenge. 
Cross-
functional 
organisation 
In some cases a challenge to involve 
operations in procurement, but 
product councils improves on this. 
Involving operations in procurement 
a challenge, hard to get management 
of departments to allocate clinicians 
for procurement projects. 
Centralised 
purchasing 
Continuous centralisation through 
consolidation of hospitals into health 
trusts and more recently regionally 
through Sykehuspartner.  
Similar tendency towards 
centralisation, and ICT has been 
regionalised for some time already. 
Procurement in general more 
fragmented across health trusts than 
in the South-Eastern region.  
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Another reason that we cannot do a best practice comparison is that we simply do not have the 
means to clearly assess whether or not the projects have been successful. In fact, this can be 
attributed to the elements of Cousins supply wheel that we did not include when making the 
framework comparison (see 3.2.9), namely performance measurement and the concept of cost-
benefit. These were not included because no other authors had mentioned it, and we found little 
evidence for it in the initial stages of our data collection, which perhaps is attributed to the fact 
that most of the projects were still ongoing. According to the experience of Andresen of Imatis, 
the specialised health services in Norway do not extensively evaluate the impact innovation 
projects has on the organisation. If this is true, then the lack of right performance measurement 
might be another barrier to consider. 
Without a clear cost-benefit evaluation of the projects, we looked at two dimensions that we 
could at least roughly interpret: the degree of innovation and time used compared to anticipated 
timespan. The placement along the two dimensions is displayed in Figure 26. Starting with the 
degree of innovation, it is hard to place the projects in terms of adaptive or developmental PPI, 
primarily for the reason that they all had a combination of both. Mobilix and Seekuence Medical 
were adapted from other industries, but to the degree that it required more developmental than 
what can ascribed as purely adaptive. Similar with e-kurve and MetaVision, there were existing 
solutions, but still quite some development was required. As such, this raises the question as to 
how important the degree of novelty is, as opposed to for example the impact the new solution 
has on the organisation.   
 
Figure 26: Time and degree of innovation for the four projects 
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In terms of timespan, assessment is similarly difficult. All projects took much longer time than 
anticipated, perhaps with the exception of Mobilix. However, this was not only due to problems 
delaying the different phases, but also the fact that the projects turned out to be much larger 
than anticipated. As such, the question is, what delay was due to what? At least for e-kurve it 
should be possible to say that almost nine years goes beyond what is reasonable even for such a 
complex project. However, this does not mean that it has become obsolete, although the Central 
Norway RHA is at a point where they need to consider whether or not to proceed with the 
deployment of e-kurve.  
In the following we will go through each of the six propositions, and see if they hold (RQ1). In 
addition we will try to understand the barriers better, so that we can see how they can be 
managed (RQ2).  
5.1 Lack of procurement as a strategic function  
In the theoretical chapter, we formulated the following proposition: 
P1: The lack of procurement as a strategic function is a barrier for public procurement for 
innovation. 
Following the literature, we distinguished between clerical and strategic purchasing. While 
strategic purchasing is a broad topic, and can include the other categories, we also argued that 
there are certain fundamental indicators that make a purchasing function strategic. These are, as 
described in 3.3.1 and paraphrasing Castaldi et al. to fit the specialised health services: 
1) A long term procurement plan 
2) Alignment between procurement and strategy of the regional health authority 
3) The directors in the regional health authority including input from procurement 
4) Coordination of procurement strategies across health trusts  
It was clear from the interviewees in both regions that with procurement making up a third of 
the expenses, it was necessary to see procurement as a strategic function. It was also evident that 
procurement had come a long way over the past ten years, when it was primarily a clerical 
function. However, the maturity of the procurement function was different in the two regions, 
with South-Eastern Norway RHA generally being one step ahead. Procurement was both a part 
of the 2013-2020 strategy of the RHA, albeit relatively small, and they had a separate 
procurement strategy for 2013-2016. In the assessment made by McKinsey, the procurement 
function was described as second generation, on a scale from zero to four, and still presented as 
a support function, rather than one that was strategic. At the same time, Istad stated that a value 
for money over the long term was becoming more common concept in the region. Procurement 
was relatively centralised through Sykehuspartner, which suggests a certain degree of 
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coordination across the health trusts. Considering all of this, we would place the South-Eastern 
Norway RHA between step four and five, see Figure 27. 
In Central Norway, the situation is a bit different. No mention is made in the 2020 strategy of 
the RHA, and we also did not find a concrete procurement strategy like the one for South-
Eastern Norway RHA, only a more general statement that procurement should become more 
strategic. Skage assesses that procurement cannot yet be described as a strategic function, and 
that it is hard to take care of long-term strategic tasks while the limited human resources are tied 
to doing short-term operational tasks. The lack of a director position for purchasing also 
indicates a lack of status, and it is less likely that procurement is an important input to top level 
strategy. As such, the procurement function could be considered less mature than in South-
Eastern Norway, placed on the third stage: efficient use of public funds. 
 
Figure 27: Position of the two regional health authorities in the seven stage model 
Of the two regions it is the South-Eastern Norway RHA that has taken the lead in public 
procurement for innovation, which may of course be coincidental, but we still think can be 
attributed to the fact that the procurement function operates on a higher strategic level. It is also 
the impression of Istad that making procurement a more strategic function is strongly related 
with public procurement for innovation. At the same time, it does not remove the possibility of 
having public procurement innovation without the presence of a strategic purchasing function. 
However, the regional health authorities do not quite fit the “entrepreneurial” organisation 
described by Castaldi et al., who are able to stimulate innovation without having a strategic 
purchasing function. 
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According to Harland et al. innovation becomes a priority only on the last stage of the seven 
stage model. This implies that innovation only is a priority when government policy objectives 
are. This is true in one respect, as the strong pressure from government to do something with 
public procurement for innovation certainly is an important reason as to why public 
procurement for innovation is a hot topic in the specialised health services. At the same time, we 
would argue that it is possible for a public entity to see the value of innovation without being 
told to innovate. If adapting a truly long-term perspective, it should be clear for the regional 
health services that innovation can help improve their health services to citizens. 
In summary, we find that moving the procurement function from a short-term efficiency focus 
to a long-term strategic value for money focus has a positive impact on public procurement for 
innovation. This can also be explained by the fact that procurement for innovation requires a 
long-term perspective to see the benefits. At the same time, we also see the benefit of reaching 
the last stages in the Harland model, but argue that it should also be possible to have focus on 
procurement for innovation in the fifth stage (value for money). As such, we argue that the lack 
of a sufficiently strategic procurement function is a barrier to public procurement for innovation. 
5.2 Lack of integration of the innovation process 
In the theoretical chapter, we formulated the following proposition: 
P2: The lack of integration of the innovation process in the purchasing process is a barrier to 
public procurement for innovation. 
Looking at typical representations of a demand-driven innovation process and the procurement 
process, we found that, while different in many aspects, both processes shared the same start, a 
demand, and the same end, fulfilment of that demand. This led us to suggest that these processes 
should be viewed as integrated, rather than independent of each other. While the lack of 
integration does not mean that there is no innovation, we would think that it is important to 
know when and how the innovation takes place. This becomes clearer when looking at the 
process of the four projects we described, as shown in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28: Process of the ICT projects 
Of the four projects we have looked at, three are typical procurement projects (MetaVision, 
Mobilix, e-kurve), while the last is a typical innovation project (Seekuence Medical). The crucial 
difference between the two is that in the case of traditional procurement projects, the 
development and piloting stages comes after the decision to procure on a commercial basis is 
taken, while for the innovation project this takes place beforehand, in what can be considered a 
pre-commercial stage. However, for the innovation project the aim too is to eventually reach a 
commercial procurement stage. We therefore find that there are two main places the innovation 
process can be integrated in the procurement process, either as part of the commercial 
procurement or in a separate pre-commercial procurement. This is illustrated in Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29: Possible points for integration of the innovation process 
The implications of this difference are substantial. Moving the development (design & 
prototyping) and piloting (testing & validation) stages before the final decision on a scaled, 
commercial procurement of the solution would mean that procurement is split in two, a pre-
commercial and a commercial phase. One advantage of this is that it is not necessary to lock 
specifications in one large tendering process, and in such a way offset the risk associated with the 
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uncertainty that follows procurement for innovation. In addition to this, it would be easier to 
terminate the project along the way, if it turns out that it does not meet expectations. In other 
words, it would be possible to introduce gates after different stages, as proposed by the Stage-
Gate model by Cooper (see 3.3.2).  
The case of Seekuence Medical illustrates possible challenges that may arise having development 
and piloting in a pre-commercial stage. Although Posicom had successfully developed a 
prototype, the piloting phase was not sufficiently comprehensive, and hence failed to produce 
the necessary validation in order to transition to the stage of commercial procurement. 
Apparently this is not an unusual problem, and one cause appears to be funding. A typical 
innovation project funded by Innovation Norway commonly ends with the prototype and a 
small pilot, which for ICT solutions does not validate if it works in more complex environments. 
This gap in funding can be addressed either by extending the funding by Innovation Norway, or 
by allocating additional resources in the procurement budget of the hospital trust or regional 
health authority. According to Andersen of Imatis, the latter would lead to more customer 
commitment to the project.  
In addition to the potential problems of creating a gap between the pre-commercial and 
commercial procurement, such an approach would be more resource intensive than the usual 
approach. If, as the pre-commercial procurement model by the European Commission suggests, 
more than on company are included in the pre-commercial stages, this would naturally increase 
costs. As such, the stage procurement model should only be applied if there is a high degree of 
uncertainty connected to the procurement, and the benefit of learning from multiple companies 
is high. This would in particular be useful for radical innovation, i.e. in the case of developmental 
PPI. However, other aspects may be important when considering whether innovation should be 
conducted through pre-commercial or commercial procurement. In cases where the supplier 
comes with the idea, there might be no other way than to do it through pre-commercial 
procurement. 
To summarise, we suggest that the innovation process needs to be more consciously included in 
the procurement process. Perhaps the most important decision is whether innovation should 
take place as part of the commercial procurement or through a pre-commercial procurement. 
Today, we do not see this more as coincidence than an informed decision. Innovation projects 
are started without any clear plan for ensuing procurement, and procurement projects are started 
without considering if there needs to be a pre-commercial procurement. As we see it, choosing 
the wrong process might turn out to be a substantial barrier to public procurement for 
innovation. An example of this is e-kurve, where Presthus also suggested that it might have been 
better to procure prototypes first, to understand better how to specify the commercial 
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procurement. In the end, this is also about acknowledging the fact that external innovation is a 
part of managing external resources, and as such concerns procurement (see definition of 
procurement in 3.1.1). 
5.3 Lack of collaborative relationship 
In the theoretical chapter, we formulated the following proposition: 
P3: The lack of collaborative relationships with the suppliers is a barrier for public procurement 
for innovation. 
Following the logic of scholars before us (see 3.3.3), we argued that public procurement for 
innovation required interactive learning, which in turn called for close collaboration between the 
supplier and customer. Both in the South-Eastern RHA and Central Norway RHA they 
emphasised the importance of dialogue and early involvement of suppliers, and they considered 
that this was a pre-requisite for arriving at innovative solutions. However, as Istad pointed out, 
market analysis and dialogue is something that should be done for any procurement; it is simply 
good procurement practice. As such, if it is the intention to conduct procurement that leads to 
innovative solution, i.e. explicit PPI, one could argue that the amount of market dialogue needs 
to be higher than for normal procurement, and that the involvement of suppliers needs to come 
earlier than for normal procurement.  
To achieve this, two elements become important: time and money. By the first we mean the time 
from a demand is communicated from the clinical operations, to the required delivery. Logically, 
the shorter this time, the harder it will be to have extensive dialogue with the market. Therefore, 
the procurement function needs to communicate to clinical operations that needs that require 
the procurement of innovative solutions must be communicated early. As for money, it should 
be clear that more dialogue with the market will require that both customer and supplier put in 
more work hours, which translate to labour costs. This problem is visible in Central Norway 
RHA, where the lack of procurers and focus on urgent operational procurement will make it 
hard to allocate resources to extensive dialogue. Here it could be necessary to have a clear link 
between the cost put into additional resources and the resulting benefit. Unfortunately, in terms 
of innovation such cost-benefit links can be hard to establish. 
In the procurement projects, and in particular e-kurve, we learnt that dialogue had taken place. 
E-kurve followed the competitive dialogue procedure, where they had a session with each 
qualified candidate before they finalised the tender specifications. However, as Presthus argued, 
this was not sufficient. The tender specifications they formulated at that time were not good 
enough to capture the uncertainty and complexity of the project and this led to problems 
afterwards. Much more interaction with the supplier would have been required, and perhaps 
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even pre-commercial stages where the candidates are asked to develop prototypes – before the 
tender specifications for the procurement are defined. With this we are back to the discussion 
from 5.2 on whether development stages should take place before or after the tendering process. 
However, here we want to focus on the nature of the tender specifications and its role in 
determining the nature of the relationships.  
Several of the interviewees argued that the RHAs historically had been far too detailed in their 
tender specifications, which in turn made it impossible for the suppliers to come up with new 
solutions. This is particularly well illustrated through the experiences by Andresen and Imatis, 
who in the development of Natus had to fulfil 5 000 specifications, essentially killing any 
innovative activity. Presthus described a similar situation for e-kurve. Once the contract was 
signed, the focus was order fulfilment according to the set specifications, instead of interactive 
learning. In other words, it is necessary to reduce the amount of specifications, and move to 
functional requirements instead of technical specifications, as stated in the document on public 
procurement for innovation by the RHAs. 
The effect of reducing the specifications essentially opens up for more interaction after the 
contract has been entered. As not all details have been set in stone, the supplier and customer 
can collaborate along the way and are freer to address challenges that arise and which were not 
known upon entering the contract. This fundamentally shifts the relationship between supplier 
and customer. The public procurer will have to give up the possibility to control the supplier 
through a detailed contract, and instead trust that the supplier’s ability to develop a good 
solution. In other words, reducing the dependency on contractual specifications and introducing 
functional requirements moves the relationship from strictly contractual arm’s length towards 
collaborative. 
As we found in both regions, the practice of over-specifying the tender specifications and 
resulting contract has been reduced significantly, although it still occurs. This is not surprising, as 
reducing specifications can reduce control, which might be uncomfortable for the procurer. It 
requires a culture of trust and taking risks, something we will discuss further in 5.4. According to 
what we have found, we find it reasonable to state that it is better to address the uncertainty that 
public procurement for innovation through stepwise interaction with the supplier, which requires 
trust, than to manage it through contract alone. 
Some scholars have argued that the nature of the public sector prevents it from having close 
relationships with its suppliers. Based on the discussion above, we want to give a bit nuanced 
picture of this. As we have seen, there is nothing preventing public procurers to move from a 
relationship governed primarily by contract to one built on trust and collaboration. At the same 
time it is true that the public sector is different than the private sector, but not insomuch because 
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of the regulation, as the conditions that underlie them: transparency, equal treatment and non-
discrimination. The result is that each new contract requires them to give all suppliers the same 
opportunities, i.e. they cannot prefer the existing supplier.  As such, while it is not a problem to 
have strong collaborative relationships, the length of the relationship might not always be as long 
as in the private sector. However, this too should be stated with care. As we saw, Siemens has 
had a long history with providing ICT solutions to the hospitals in Central Norway. 
Furthermore, it is hard and not really desirable to be completely free of the dependencies that 
arise throughout the solutions that are delivered. This is well illustrated with the question the 
Central Norway RHA is facing on whether or not to switch from Siemens’ Doculive to DIPS. 
As the switching costs are immense, it is clear that they cannot toggle back and forth between 
the two systems every fourth year, but rather need to make a long term assessment. 
Summarising our analysis, we can divide collaborative relationship into two: the interaction that 
takes place prior to the tendering process and signing the contract, and the interaction that takes 
place after. While we found that interaction to clarify the specifications is important for any 
procurement, we reasoned that the intensity needed to be higher and the timespan longer for 
public procurement for innovation. In terms of interaction after the contract, we suggested that 
the contract was essential to whether the relationship would take form of arm’s length contract 
fulfilment or interactive collaboration between supplier and customer. We find that collaborative 
relationship in all stages of the procurement process, including innovation, is necessary for 
successful procurement for innovation. As such, the lack thereof will constitute a barrier to 
public procurement for innovation.. 
5.4 Lack of culture for innovation 
In the theoretical chapter, we formulated the following proposition: 
P4: The lack of culture for innovation is a barrier for public procurement for innovation. 
When we investigated the literature in our study we uncovered that researchers propose a 
distinct culture for stimulating innovation, and that the absence of such a culture can act as a 
barrier. We found that incorporating a questioning attitude in addition to having a collaborative, 
open culture and incentives positively related to challenging the status quo are characteristics of 
culture that generates innovation. In literature describing the public sector, we saw that scholars 
argued that this culture for innovation was lacking, among other due to an asymmetric incentive 
structure. We also questioned whether a lack of culture for innovation can be considered a trait 
of purchasing in general, and therefore a possible problem for public procurement. 
Starting with the specialised health services in Norway as a whole, it can hardly be argued that 
innovation does not take place. The South-Eastern Norway RHA spends 1.7 billion NOK on 
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R&D, and innovation is increasingly a topic, with own organisations like Inven2 and NTNU 
TTO to commercialise research findings. However, this falls within the domain of research-
driven innovation, and for user driven innovation the picture is somewhat different. Also this 
part receives a significant amount of attention these days, facilitated among other through 
InnoMed. However, attention from above is not necessarily the same as a culture for innovation. 
Speaking with the interviewees, a more nuanced picture emerges. Noddeland claimed that many 
clinicians are genuinely interested in improving their working environment. However, he also 
pointed to the fact that there is not really time to work on this, as everyone is busy with their 
daily schedule. This leaves only a smaller selection of enthusiasts, who are willing to work in the 
evenings or weekends. Skage also mentioned such enthusiasts, but was not so sure if the only 
problem is that clinicians are not given time to work on innovation projects. For many, he 
argued, partaking in such projects (here referring to procurement projects) is not that appealing if 
it is not directly connected to clinical work. We will not conclude here whether or not there is a 
culture for innovation in the specialised health services in Norway, as there is not enough 
empirical data to do this, but only take notice that there seems to be a lack of dedicated time for 
personnel to engage in improvement projects. We will return to this in 5.5.  
Turning to the procurement function in the two health regions, we have more information, and 
the keyword appears to be risk aversion. Both Istad and Skage found that procurers have been 
afraid of making mistakes, and while it has improved, this is still often the case. Istad attributed 
this to a strict, and in his opinion wrongful, interpretation of the regulations, which among other 
has led procurers to avoid interaction with suppliers, not to risk any differential treatment and 
ensuing complaints in KOFA. Skage found that the problem in Central Norway ultimately is that 
there is too little room to make mistakes, as this often results in negative sanctions. The result is 
too often that the procurers focus on doing the process right, instead of procuring the best 
solution, which might require innovation. It is also interesting to note that neither Istad nor 
Skage, or for that matter any of the interviewees made any mention of positive incentives for 
procurers. From this we conclude that there is indeed a lack of culture for innovation in the 
procurement function in the two regional health authorities, and that this is a barrier to public 
procurement for innovation. 
Constructing an incentive structure that encourages procurers to take more risk and procure new 
solutions that involve uncertainty can be a challenge in itself, but there can also be underlying 
factors that make this even harder. If the procurement function or the public entity as a whole 
strives towards short-term efficiency, and constructs its incentives accordingly, this will fit poorly 
with innovation, which may prove less efficient in the short to medium term. As such, moving 
towards an incentive structure that rewards procurement of innovation will require performance 
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metrics that measure something else than efficiency, and which might not actually be possible to 
measure in the short term. 
In summary, we find that there is a tendency of risk adversity in the procurement function of the 
specialised health services, and this has been and continues to be a barrier to public procurement 
for innovation. At the core of this is an incentive structure that promotes efficiency and status 
quo, rather than procurement of innovative solutions. At the same time, we do not propose to 
make all procurement projects a quest for innovation, but rather find a balance between 
efficiency (exploitation) and innovation (exploration). 
5.5 Lack of cross-functional organisation 
In the theoretical chapter, we formulated the following proposition:  
P5: The lack of cross-functional organisation is a barrier to public procurement for innovation. 
The advantages of cross-functional organisation are found both in innovation and procurement 
literature, and can be traced to the knowledge-based view (KBV), whereby organisational 
structures exist to combine different types of knowledge. In our theoretical study we found 
evidence that integrating purchasing with other functional areas has a positive effect on 
purchasing contribution to innovation. At the same time, organising across functions is a 
challenging task, and we considered that this could be a barrier in the public sector. 
All the four projects that we looked at had a cross-functional team, which was common for 
larger projects in both of the health regions. Nevertheless, several of the interviewees considered 
it a challenge to get clinicians to participate in these teams, as they were tied down with their 
daily work. In the case of Seekuence Medical, Ragnvald Otterlei, managing director of Posicom, 
voiced his frustration that there had been a lack of dedicated personnel at the hospital to work 
with the development, which had delayed the project significantly. For e-kurve too it had been 
hard to get physicians to work in the procurement project, with the additional problem that 
when other physicians were asked to test out the first prototype, they claimed that they had not 
been involved. Skage also explained that establishing the projects were too time-consuming. 
Only Istad found that this was not too large of a problem, as they for procurement in the South-
Eastern Norway RHA had established product councils, which ensured better integration with 
operations. 
The underlying problems here are different depending on whether it is an innovation project or 
procurement project. For innovation projects, according to Otterlei, Andresen and Noddeland, it 
is largely a question of money, i.e. the labour costs connected to having clinicians work on 
something other than patient treatment. However, for the exact reason that the development of 
ICT solutions is put up against treatment that potentially saves life, this is hard to do. Noddeland 
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stated that there were strong budget constraints, with a short-term perspective making it hard to 
justify return in the longer term. Therefore they were highly dependent on the resources made 
available by Innovation Norway. Andersen too saw this short-term perspective in many 
hospitals, which were busy firefighting. According to him, they first had to balance their budgets, 
and then take on a long term perspective, where some of the budget is allocated for innovation. 
This would also raise the commitment he argued. 
For procurement projects, Skage found that the most important point was to get middle 
management in the different clinical departments to understand that procurement was in fact an 
important part of the clinical work. If procurement is delayed or stopped even, that will 
eventually have consequences for clinical work. Establishing product councils after the model of 
the South-Eastern Norway RHA could help on this.  
It can appear that, while participating in cross-functional teams was given less priority both in 
innovation and procurement projects, the problem for innovation projects was to convince 
hospitals that they should spend their own money on it at all, as it had no short-term benefit, 
while the necessity for the procurement projects was more visible, and not such much a question 
of money as finding the right resources for the right time. One way to address the first problem 
could be to incorporate innovation projects into the procurement process of the regional health 
authorities, as suggested in 5.2. This might make the link to commercial procurement and value 
for the hospitals in the region clearer, and might also justify the allocation of resources from the 
regional health authority. 
Also related to our discussion on processes in 5.2 is the question where the integration of 
operations takes place, and where operations meet the supplier. As we found from both Istad 
and Skage, the increasing focus on dialogue with the market prior to and in the tendering process 
also included new contact points with the supplier before the contract was signed, such as 
supplier conferences where clinicians would participate. Andresen said that such contact with 
operations was valuable, as it gave them as suppliers the possibility to find out what was actually 
needed, and not just communicated through the procurement function. However, in his opinion 
it was even better to be invited to the hospitals, where suppliers could observe the work flow, 
and make up their own suggestions on what was needed. Both cases illustrate that integration is 
not only important between the procurement function and operations, but also between the 
supplier and operations, as illustrated in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30: Points of integration 
In summary, we find that the lack of cross-functional organisation is a barrier to public 
procurement for innovation in the specialised health services, despite the fact that projects are 
organised in cross-functional teams. The Achilles’ heel is the access to the right clinicians, which 
in part can be primarily attributed to a short-term focus that does not give room for innovation 
that provides long-term benefits. 
5.6 Lack of centralised purchasing 
In the theoretical chapter, we formulated the following proposition: 
P6: The lack of centralised purchasing is a barrier for public procurement for innovation. 
The presence of a local, regional and national layer in public procurement in the specialised 
health services in Norway adds to the complexity of public procurement for innovation. At the 
same time it gives us the possibility to discuss if it is better to have a centralised or decentralised 
structure for public procurement for innovation. In the theoretical chapter we proposed that 
centralised procurement was preferable, where the positive effect from aggregating demand on 
public procurement for innovation was emphasised (see 3.1.3 and 3.3.5). 
Among the interviewees, there were exclusively positive views on the centralisation that had 
taken place on procurement in both in the South-Eastern and Central Norway health regions. 
The predominant view was that procurement had been too decentralised, and this had been an 
impediment in conducting professional, strategic procurement. While scale was brought up as a 
reason for centralising procurement, by the logic that it required less resources to purchase 
products that were needed in all health trusts regionally, perhaps the strongest argument made 
for centralisation was the need to build competence.  
 
 
85 
 
It is interesting to note that the effect aggregating demand could have on supplier’s willingness to 
innovate was not mentioned by the interviewees. One reason for this could simply be that most 
of the procurement projects that involved innovation, including those we looked at, had been 
sufficiently large to spark the interest of the suppliers. As such, one could argue that, from the 
argument of scaling up and aggregating demand, the requirement for further centralisation is not 
that strong. 
Rather, focus should be on the need for competence building. This leads to the question as to 
which competence is important for public procurement for innovation. As the average 
procurement project involving innovation would be more complex than that of regular 
procurement, it would certainly require more in procurement skills. In addition, the importance 
of customer sophistication 3.1.3 shows that the competence of operations is valuable, which also 
follows from the discussion on cross-functional organisation. As such, efforts to centralise need 
to be accompanied by measures to ensure that operations are still included. The product councils 
in the South-Eastern Norway health region are a good example of such a measure. 
In summary, the question as to whether public procurement for innovation benefits from a 
centralised or decentralised procurement strategy is hard to answer. The need for a certain 
volume to attract suppliers seems less important here, than the necessity of pooling competence. 
As such, we can say that a certain amount of centralisation probably would be beneficial for 
public procurement for innovation, but it is hard to conclude on the degree of centralisation. 
Here other factors in the discussion of centralisation versus decentralisation will probably be 
more important than that of innovation.  
 
  
86 
 
  
 
 
87 
 
6 Conclusion and recommendations 
In this chapter, we will conclude our findings by returning to the two research questions we 
started with. Furthermore, we will attempt to give some concrete recommendation that can be 
used by practitioners. Lastly, we will share some thoughts on how our findings can affect further 
research in the field of public procurement for innovation.  
6.1 RQ1: What are the barriers to public procurement for innovation? 
Through our theoretical review we formulated six potential barriers to public procurement for 
innovation. Through empirical data collection and subsequent analysis, we tried to evaluate if 
these would hold true. Our conclusion is that all of them do, with the exception of lack of 
centralisation, which we were not able to substantiate sufficiently.  
The lack of strategic procurement is in our opinion a fundamental barrier, one which essentially 
has an effect on the others. Although we to deal with them separately in our analysis tried, 
making procurement more strategic also means enabling collaborative relationships and stronger 
integration with other functions in the organisation. In the end, the reason that strategic 
procurement is so important for public procurement for innovation is that it very often is 
strategic. Procurement for innovation can have a significant impact on the organisation, as is 
illustrated by the organisational change that comes alongside the digitalisation of the health 
services. It also requires a long-term perspective, as the benefits will not materialise immediately 
and there will be failures. As such, public procurement for innovation, which is exploratory in 
nature, will be different from procurement focusing on exploitation (see distinction made in 
3.1.1). This will be a challenge for public organisations that focus on short-term efficiency and 
exploitation. 
The lack of integration of the innovation process in procurement for innovation is also a 
problem. It is not possible to view external innovation as a normal order, where the supplier 
innovates according to a blueprint. Rather, there needs to be an understanding that the 
innovation happens in the intersection of supplier and customer, and that innovation is a part of 
managing external resources, which is what procurement is all about (see van Weele’s definition 
of purchasing in 3.1.1). Procurement for innovation is hard to achieve without an innovation 
process, and one question should be whether this takes place as part of the commercial 
procurement process, or as a separate pre-commercial procurement. The latter would arguably 
be more resource intensive, but could especially make sense in cases of radical innovation, i.e. 
developmental PPI. 
The lack of collaborative relationship is in our opinion a central barrier to public procurement 
for innovation, but involves more than merely increased dialogue throughout a tendering 
process. Essentially it is a different type of mindset than for a regular procurement. Again, 
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instead of taking the approach that the role of suppliers is to deliver to specification, it should be 
that supplier and customer go together to solve the problem of the customer. It means that the 
customer cannot and should not fully control the supplier through contract, but instead needs to 
trust the supplier. For this to happen it is important to have a culture that allows for trust-based 
relationships to take place. 
The lack of culture for innovation is another barrier to public procurement for innovation, and 
refers to the problem that arises when the procurer is risk adverse and driven by efficiency. By 
nature, innovation involves accepting that failures will occur, but in the long-term there will be a 
return on pursuing new solutions to both old and new demand. A challenge with culture is that it 
commonly requires time to change, and it often does not pertain to separate departments, but 
rather the organisation as a whole. 
The lack of cross-functional organisation is in our opinion a barrier that has received little 
attention. This is important for any larger procurement project, but especially when innovation is 
involved, as innovation ultimately is about change in the operational units. As such, one could 
view public procurement for innovation simultaneously as change management projects. 
Involvement of operational personnel is important for many reasons, as the source of demand in 
determining the specifications (whether communicated through explicit knowledge or observed 
tacitly), source of expertise throughout development, or recipient of the solution during 
implementation. However, their involvement should not only be restricted to the procurement 
function, but they should also be in direct contact with the supplier on the different process 
phases. 
The lack of centralisation as a barrier to public procurement for innovation proved hard to 
validate.  While we saw that a certain degree of centralisation allowed procurement to become 
more strategic and better manage procurement competence, it was in the end on the local level 
that innovation projects took place. In general centralisation may seem a necessity to be able to 
make public procurement for innovation, but it also appears to amplify another barrier, namely 
that of organising projects across operations (local) and procurement (regional). One way to look 
at it is that centralisation should not take place without at the same time ensuring good 
integration with operations (such as through product councils) and  that there furthermore can 
be limits to how far such centralisation should go. 
6.2 RQ2: How can barriers to public procurement for innovation be managed? 
In order to answer the second research question, we will follow up on the description of the 
barriers above, which already implies certain actions. In simple terms, once barriers have been 
identified, the general response should be to remove the barriers, e.g. lack of collaboration calls 
for more collaboration and lack of cross-functional organisation calls for more integration across 
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functions. However, the description of the barriers also reveals a certain complexity, and adding 
to this complexity is interdependency. Therefore, in order to answer the second research 
question, we need to look at how the barriers relate to each other, something we only have 
pointed to sporadically up until now. Here we present a model for public procurement for 
innovation as shown in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31: Model for public procurement for innovation 
At the core of our model is a collaborative relationship. It is the single most important aspect 
driving public procurement for innovation, as frequently iterated by scholars and practitioners 
alike, and we find that all the other elements lead up to this. It refers to all the interaction that 
takes place from the demand or idea is generated through the specification, development, 
piloting and full-scale delivery, including the process required to select the supplier(s). Here it is 
important to have a good dialogue in the early phases, but also to ensure interaction through the 
development and piloting phase that come later. This can be ensured in two ways. If 
development and piloting is a part of the commercial procurement process, it is important to 
design a contract that does not constrain the development through too technical specifications, 
but instead relies on functional requirements. This approach opens up the possibility for supplier 
and customer to develop the product jointly in a trust-based relationship, rather than having the 
supplier deliver to specifications in a contractual relationship. A second possibility is to move 
development and piloting before the commercial procurement, i.e. divide procurement into two 
stages: pre-commercial and commercial procurement. This will give the procurer more freedom 
in terms of interaction with the supplier, which could especially be useful for developmental PPI. 
However, it would still be necessary to select the supplier(s) on a certain set of criteria, which 
90 
 
would not so much depend on the product solution (which does not yet exist) as on the 
capabilities of the supplier (such as the ability to innovate).  
There are three groups that are central in a cross-functional collaborative relationship: the users 
(operations), the procurers and the suppliers. As we have in this study only looked at the 
customer side, we will not go further into detail on the supplier, other than to say that we expect 
there to be barriers connected to the supplier as well. For both the users and suppliers, there are 
essential three factors that are decisive for a good collaborative relationship: the willingness, 
ability and possibility. We will look at these three factors, first for the procurers and then for 
operations. 
Willingness refers back to culture, where the most important measure would be to create an 
incentive structure that rewards procurers who explore new possibilities and not only exploits 
existing solutions. Ability essentially refers to competence development, in which centralisation 
may play an important role. A procurer would require a specific set of skills, such as relationship 
management skills, strategic thinking, cross-functional working and communication skills 5 . 
Lastly, procurers need to have the necessary resources that make it possible to engage in a 
collaborative relationship, which generally is more resource-intensive than an arm-length 
relationship. 
For operations, such as in our case for clinicians, perhaps the most important aspect is that of 
resources, i.e. making the right people available. In a hospital where time not only means money, 
but also saving lives, this can be a challenge. However, also here the willingness is important, as 
clinicians need to be convinced that it makes sense that they work on something else than their 
operational tasks. Lastly, competence is relevant. It is not only important to make clinicians 
available, it is also important to ensure that they are the right clinicians, i.e. have knowledge that 
will benefit the project. While centralising operations, which by nature is decentralised, would be 
a poor idea, other ways of organising, such as the network organisation in the South-Eastern 
Norway RHA is useful in order to coordinate knowledge across the local entities (e.g. health 
trusts). 
Underlying the three aspects of willingness, ability and possibility is what we have called long-
term strategic thinking. In order to create an incentive structure that rewards exploration that 
may first pay off in the long term, or to use more resources to engage in collaborative 
relationships, it is essential to have an organisation that does not only aim to become highly 
efficient in the short-term, but that also assumes a long-term perspective. If it is true that public 
organisations in general are focused on efficiency, a statement we do not know if we fully agree 
                                                 
5 These examples are taken from Cousins (2008, p. 117) on supply competencies on strategic products. 
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with, then that may be the most fundamental and serious barrier to public procurement for 
innovation of them all. 
To summarise, managing barriers to public procurement for innovation is essentially about 
providing conditions for collaborative relationships to take place. This means that procurers and 
clinicians are given the right incentives and resources, as well as having the right competence. 
Underlying this is the need for strategic long-term approach, which makes it possible to engage 
in the exploratory nature of public procurement for innovation.  
6.3 Implications for practitioners 
In the following, we will build on the conclusion of the second research question above, which 
already gives a good view of the implications for practitioners. Here we will try to make it clearer 
who needs to do what, primarily addressed to the specialised health services in Norway. 
Implications for procurers: For procurers, at least those who are likely to lead procurement for 
innovation projects, certain decisions have to be taken. First, the procurer has to assess if this is 
should be considered a procurement for innovation, or if it is a regular procurement. This may 
not always be that easy to know up front, and at this point it is already important to have contact 
both with operations (where the demand comes from) and with the market. If it is considered to 
be a procurement for innovation project, the next step is to outline the process. An important 
decision here is whether the procurement should be conducted in two stages, i.e. first pre-
commercial procurement and then commercial procurement, or if it is sufficient to have the 
development stages as a part of the commercial procurement.  
In the case of the first, if the supplier came with the idea, the pre-commercial phase would take 
place with this supplier. If not, a supplier selection stage would be required, where focus should 
be on the capabilities of the supplier, as the final solution will not yet exist. The other approach, 
to have development as part of the commercial procurement, would require a procurement 
process where the specification phase is done in conjunction with operations and the suppliers. 
A supplier conference, with clinicians present, would be a good start for this. Furthermore, it 
would be recommended to use procurement procedures which make it possible for suppliers to 
outline their solution design, such as competitive dialogue or the negotiated procedure. Lastly, it 
would be important not to make a too detailed contract, but instead rely on functional 
requirements that open for interaction in the ensuing development stage. In short, the procurer 
has to make decisions that enable customer-supplier interaction in all stages. 
Implications for managers in the procurement department: Managers for procurement 
need to give procurers the right conditions for public procurement for innovation. They have to 
make it possible for procurers to spend time on it, which may require the recruitment of more 
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personnel. Furthermore, they have to give the right incentives, which create a culture where 
procurers seek to explore new possibilities and are not afraid of making mistakes. Lastly, they 
have to work on competence development, which would require training of the procurers.  
Implications for managers in the operational departments: Managers in operations need to 
realise that both procurement and innovation is an important part of their work, as both may 
improve the services they provide in the long term. This means that some of the labour 
resources should be allocated to these projects. Furthermore, in the cases that external 
innovation projects take place in these departments, the procurement department should be 
included, so as to make it part of a pre-commercial scheme upon which a commercial 
procurement will follow. Without this connection, there is likely to be a gap between the end of 
the innovation project and the planned large-volume procurement.   
Implications for top management: While middle management will have the freedom to take 
certain measures, much of the above-mentioned actions would have to go through top 
management. In essence, they are the main strategic layer in an organisation, and as such, they 
are decisive in matters such as resource allocation and whether the organisation should focus on 
efficiency or take a more long-term perspective. In the end, it boils down to management 
commitment, and if it is not possible to get the support from top management, the measures 
outlined will be less effective. There should be a clear plan for how the whole organisation deals 
with external innovation. 
6.4 Implications for research 
In this part, we will first discuss the need for replicating our study in order to strengthen or 
supplement our findings. Next we will go through three concrete implications we think our study 
can have for research. At this point we will include a small discussion on why we think pre-
commercial procurement should be treated as a part of public procurement for innovation. At 
the end, we will share some thoughts on the direction we think research on public procurement 
for innovation should take.    
First, to strengthen our findings, the study should be replicated to other contexts, to see what is 
generalisable and what is restricted to ICT solutions in the specialised health services in Norway. 
While we think ICT solutions is a significant area for external innovation in the public sector, 
there are other potential products, which may have different characteristics. For one, we have 
noticed that ICT projects not only bring with them novelty, but also complexity. While it is in 
the nature of innovative products to bring about change, probably not all require complete new 
work processes. We have tried to separate uncertainty from complexity in our study, but there 
might be more subtle causes that we have not picked up. It is also expected that other public 
sector entities will be different than the specialised health services, such as municipalities or 
 
 
93 
 
agencies managing the public infrastructure. One example is that the health services have a 
strong research tradition, which may be less the case for other public entities. Lastly, we can 
expect differences in other countries, where regulations outside the EU/EEA zone would only 
be one of many aspects to consider. 
For the findings of our study, we in particular want to draw the attention to the model presented 
in Figure 31 above. We think that this can be a good starting point for researchers in the field of 
public procurement for innovation. Moreover, we want to focus on three aspects: 
1) In our opinion, one important contribution is how we have incorporated the innovation 
process in the procurement process, and shown how public procurement for innovation can 
either take place as part of the commercial procurement or in two stages, where a pre-
commercial procurement precedes the commercial procurement. More research would be 
required to learn which process suits which procurement. At the heart of this is the notion that 
external innovation is a matter of procurement, even if it may not originate in the procurement 
department. 
2) Furthermore, we have shown that it is quite possible to have a relatively strong degree of 
collaborative relationship in the public sector. We do not dismiss the particularities of the public 
sector, where the regulations are one impediment, but the whole picture is that it is possible. It 
may, however, take a different form than the private sector. 
3) Perhaps more importantly, we have looked at what other factors need to be in place for public 
procurement for innovation to work, as depicted in Figure 31. At the heart of this, we argue, is 
the need for long term strategic thinking, because focus on efficiency will not allow for the 
exploration required to uncover new possibilities. We hope that others will build on this, so that 
a clearer picture emerges as to what the drivers of public procurement for innovation are. 
As we imply in our first point above, and a realisation we had relatively early in our study, is the 
point that pre-commercial procurement should be viewed as a part of public procurement for 
innovation. The view that external innovation is a part of procurement is in our opinion 
important, and why we disagree with Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, who claim that pre-
commercial procurement (PCP) should not be considered procurement6. As this goes against a 
prominent researcher in the field, we would like to elaborate on this in the next two paragraphs. 
Firstly, Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia (2012a, p. 3) state that “no actual product 
development and no buyer of such a product are involved in PCP”. As the stages of pre-
                                                 
6 They have in fact written a paper called “Why pre-commercial procurement is not innovation procurement” 
(2012b), where they argue that it should be called pre-competitive R&D. 
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commercial procurement, as presented by the European Commission, are product idea, solution 
design, prototype and first test-products (see European Commission, 2008), we find it peculiar to 
conclude that there is no product development. It might be that Edquist and Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia refer to the lack of commercialisation, i.e. that they consider procurement to take 
place only in this stage, while preceding stages are development. This would go against our, and 
van Weele’s, definition (see 3.1.1), where procurement is the management of external resources.  
Secondly, Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia argue that pre-commercial procurement is a matter 
of public R&D funding, and conclude that this excludes it from being a demand-side innovation 
policy instrument. We disagree with this reasoning, and argue that an innovation project driven 
by the demand of the customer should be considered demand-side. The type of financing is not 
the defining factor. Furthermore, pre-commercial procurement can be financed in part or 
completely by the procuring organisation. So as long as pre-commercial procurement involves 
external innovation driven by the demand of the customer, we would consider it a part of public 
procurement for innovation. 
Lastly, for the general direction of research on public procurement for innovation, we think that 
it needs to incorporate more of the vast amount of purchasing literature that exists. This is not to 
say that this is not done at all, but it is still our opinion that research on public procurement in 
general, and on public procurement for innovation specifically, appears more as a separated part 
of purchasing literature than an integral part of it. Part of this is perhaps due to the fact that 
many of the articles in the field look at the broader picture for the public as a whole, without 
going into the specific organisations, as we have tried to do in our study. There certainly are 
differences between private purchasing and public procurement, but all in all they are very much 
alike. As such, it is a pity that they are separated by more than just terminology.  
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8 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Literature review 
Author Year Journal Citations Title 
Research 
method Key takeways Intended use 
Public procurement 
Bryntse 1996 European 
Journal of 
Purchasing & 
Supply 
Management 
25 The purchasing of 
public services 
Mixed-
methods 
with both 
empirical 
case studies 
and 
analytical 
conceptual 
- The characteristics of 
services and the public 
purchasing proces 
- Adresses critical issues 
in purchasing public 
services 
- Barriers in the 
form of 
unrecognized issues 
Uyarra, 
Flanagan 
2010 European 
Planning 
Studies 
26 Understanding the 
innovation impacts 
of public 
procurement 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Public procurement is 
a multi-objective policy 
-  A one-size-fits-all 
model is unlikely to 
work across all 
procurement contexts  
- Policy-makers should 
focus on promoting 
innovation-friendly 
practices across all 
types of procurement 
at all levels of 
governance 
- Yet all types of 
procurement are likely 
to have impacts upon 
innocation by shaping 
the demand 
environment in which 
suppliers innovate and 
compete 
- A typology of 
public procurement 
for innovation 
Private versus public purchasing 
Lian, Laing 2004 Journal of 
Purchasing & 
Supply 
Management 
24 Public sector 
purchasing of health 
services: A 
comparison with 
private sector 
purchasing 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Argues that the public 
sector to a larger 
degree engages in 
transactional 
purchasing than the 
private sector, where 
relational purchasing 
becomes more 
important 
- Illustrate the 
differences 
between private 
and public 
purchasing 
Arbjørn, 
Freytag 
2011 International 
Journal of 
Public Sector 
Management 
0 Public procurement 
vs private 
purchasing: Is there 
any foundation for 
comparing and 
learning across the 
sectors? 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Different conditions 
for public procurement 
and private purchasing 
- Relationship forms 
differ 
- Public procurement is 
regulated 
- Discussing public 
procurement in 
constrast to private 
purchasing 
Telgen et al.  2007 Book (chapter 
of Public 
procurement: 
international 
cases and 
comentary, 
published by 
Routledge) 
19 Public procurement 
in perspective 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- The demands on 
public procurementare 
greater and more highly 
varied than those on 
private sector 
procurement 
- Additional 
demands on  public 
procurement 
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Public innovation 
Albury 2005 Public Money & 
Management 
107 Fostering innovation 
in public services 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Explains the rationale 
of public innovation 
based on 'personalized' 
public services 
- A framework for 
replication the private 
sector pressures of 
market competition 
and survival 
- Barriers in the 
form of 'pitfalls' 
when fostering 
innovation through 
the framework 
- Also explicit 
barriers 
Hartley 2005 Public Money & 
Management 
171 Innovation in 
governance and 
public services: past 
and present 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Investigates the 
different contexts of 
pubic innovation based 
on three paradigms: 
traditional public 
administration, new 
public management, 
and networked 
governance 
- Outlining public 
context 
More, Hartley 2008 Public 
Management 
Review 
67 Innovations in 
governance 
Mixed-
methods 
with both 
empirical 
case studies 
and 
analytical 
conceptual 
- Five inter-related 
characteristics 
distinguish public sector 
innovations in 
governance from 
private sector product 
and process 
innovations 
- The focus is on 
innovation in 
governance (above 
organizational level) 
- How to relate 
innovation in 
governance to 
innovations in 
products, services 
and production 
processes 
Borins 2001 Journal of 
Intellectual 
Capital 
110 Encouraging 
innovation in the 
public sector 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- There are asymmetric 
incentives for 
innovations in the 
public sector, unlike the 
private sector 
- Innovative ideas 
emerge from all levels 
of an organization 
- Conditions or 
challenges that lead 
to innovations 
Bartlett, 
Dibben 
2010 Local 
Government 
Studies 
49 Public sector 
innovation and 
entrepreneurship: 
case studies from 
local government 
Empirical 
case study 
- Public innovation may 
be enabled by public 
champions, 
empowered 
champions, and a 
sponsor 
Drivers in the form 
of suitable 
conditions 
Potts and 
Kastelle 
2010 Innovation: 
Management, 
Policy & 
Practice 
15 Public sector 
innovation research: 
what's next? 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Public sector 
innovation as a 
response to efficiency 
- Public innovaiton 
suffers from 
asymmetric incentives 
- Asymmetric 
incentives 
Public procurement and innovation 
Edler, 
Georghiou 
2007 Research policy 189 Public procurement 
and innovation - 
resurrecting the 
demand side 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- The rationales, 
potential and necessary 
framework conditions 
for the use of public 
procurement as one 
type of innovation 
policy measure 
- Strategic public 
procurement is aobut 
selecting whole market 
areas in terms of their 
importance in the 
economy and their 
apparent ripeness for 
innovation (i.e not 
picking winners) 
- A taxonomy of 
innovation policy 
tools 
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Hommen, 
Rolfstam 
2009 Journal of 
Public 
Procurement 
17 Public procurement 
and innovation: 
towards a taxonomy 
Analytical 
conceptual 
and 
exploratory 
empirical 
case studies 
- Building on Edquist 
and Hommen (2000) 
- Modes of interaction: 
direct, co-operative, 
catalytic 
- Phases of evolution: 
early, middle, late 
- A typology for 
public procurement 
for innovation 
Edquist and 
Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia 
2012 Research policy 0 Public procurement 
for innovation as 
mission-oriented 
innovation policy 
Multiple 
empirical 
case studies 
from three 
countries 
- A taxonomy of 
different phenomena 
that are, or should be, 
labeled PPI- First 
dimension: direct PPI, 
catalytic PPI- Second 
dimension: PCP, 
adaptive PPI, 
developmental PPI- 
Interactive learning and 
regulation: cooperation 
vs competition- Using 
PPI is to a large extent a 
matter of identifying 
and human needs and 
societal problems 
- A taxonomy- 
Defining public 
procurement 
Apostol  2012 Public 
procurement 
law review 
2 Pre-commercial 
procurement in 
support of 
innovation 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Pre-commercial 
procurement as a 
means to reduce risk 
perception when 
procuring R&D 
- Explains the 
shortcomings of PCP as 
a procedure 
- The adoption of 
PCP has been poor 
Dalpe 1994 Technology in 
Society 
36 Effects on 
government 
procurement on 
industrial innovation 
Empirical 
case studies 
- The best way for 
governments to 
promote innovation is 
to take on new projects 
or improve services 
that will in turn force 
both government 
buyers and suppliers to 
surpass their respective 
levels of technical 
competence 
- Demand-side 
instruments cannot be 
isolated from supply-
side policies 
- Factors that explain 
the role of government 
procurement in 
innovation 
- Strategic actions 
- Objectives of 
public procurement 
for innovation 
Aschhoff, 
Sofka 
2009 Research policy 41 Innovation on 
demand - can public 
procurement drive 
market sucess of 
innovations? 
Mixed 
methods  
- Public procurement 
and knowledge 
spillovers from 
universities propel 
innovation success 
equally 
- The benefits of 
university knowledge 
apply uniformaly to all 
firms 
- Public procurement is 
especially effective for 
smaller firms in reginos 
under economic stress 
and in distributive 
technological services 
- Strategic actions 
to stimulate 
innovation through 
public procurement 
 
 
103 
 
Edquist 2000 Book (published 
by Pinter) 
493 Systems of 
innovation: 
technologies, 
institutions and 
organizations 
Mixed-
methods 
analytical 
conceptual 
and multiple 
empirical 
case studies 
- A systems approach to 
innovation 
- Technical change 
- Public technology 
procurement 
- The nature of 
innovation and PPI 
Strategic purchasing 
van Weele 2005 Book (published 
by 
 Purchasing and 
supply chain 
management: 
analysis, strategy, 
planning and 
practice 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Concepts and strategy 
of purchasing 
- Purchasing start with a 
demand and ends with 
the fulfilment of the 
demand 
- A model for 
purchasing process 
van der Valk 
and 
Rozemeijer 
2009 Journal of 
Services 
Marketing 
29 Buying business 
services: towards a 
structured service 
purchasing process 
Mixed-
methods 
with 
analytical 
conceptual 
and 
empirical 
survey 
- Developing a proper 
specificaion is an 
important prerequisite 
for purchasing services 
successfully 
- Therefore the 
traditional purchasing 
process must be 
expanded 
- An alternation of 
van Weele's model 
Cousins et al 2008 Book (published 
by  
47 Strategic supply 
management: 
principles, theory 
and practice 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Five decicion areas 
make up a purchasing 
strategy  
- All elements are 
related, altering one 
element will affect the 
others 
- A model for 
strategic supply 
management 
- The supply wheel 
Strategic purchasing and innovation 
Castaldi et al. 2011 Technology 
Analysis & 
Stragetic 
Management 
3 Strategic purchasing 
and innovation: a 
relational view 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Suggests that 
innovation through 
purchasing is closely 
linked to making 
purchasing strategic 
- Argues that relations 
leads to purchasing for 
innovation 
- How strategic 
purchasing 
determine 
purchasing 
contribution to 
innovation 
Mogee, Bean 1976 Industrial 
Marketing 
Management 
6 The role of 
purchasing agent in 
industrial innovation 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Purchasing agents 
appear to be a 
boundary group with 
access to important 
information 
(gatekeepers) 
Higher status for 
purchasing may 
promote the 
integration of 
information  into 
problem and/or 
opportunity 
identification 
leading to 
innovation 
Supplier innovation 
Jean et al. 2012 Decision 
Sciences 
0 Drivers and 
performance 
outcomes of supplier 
innovation 
gerneation in 
customer-supplier 
relationships: The 
role of power-
dependence 
Mixed-
methods 
with 
empirical 
tests and 
analytical 
conceptual 
Uses KBV to explain 
supplier innovation 
generation in customer-
supplier relationships 
- Importance of 
Knowledge and 
Learning 
- Contexts: 
organisational, 
technological, 
environmental 
Henke Jr., 
Zhang 
2010 MIT Sloan 
Management 
Review 
6 Increasing supplier-
driven innovation 
Analytical 
conceptual 
Argues trust and 
commitment as a 
foundation for 
innovation 
Supplier 
collaboration for 
innovation 
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Schiele 2006 Industrial 
Marketing 
Management 
80 How to distinguish 
innovative 
suppliers? 
Identifying 
innovative suppliers 
as new task for 
purchasing 
Analytical 
conceptual 
A framwork of the 
supplier, buyer-seller 
relationships and 
enabling factors 
Barriers in the form 
of missing 
characters of 
supplying 
firm/buyer-seller 
relationship or 
lacking enabling 
factors 
Innovation barriers 
D'Este et al.  2011 Research Policy 2 What hampers 
innovation? 
Revealed barriers 
versus deterring 
barriers 
Analytical 
conceptual 
It is necessary to 
distinguish between 
two kinds of barriers: 
revealed and deterring. 
Both have 
accompanying 
implications 
- Barriers: cost, 
knowledge, market, 
regulation 
Loewe, 
Dominiquini 
2006 Strategy & 
Leadership 
65 Overcoming the 
barriers to effective 
innovation 
Empirical 
survey 
- Major obstacles to 
innovation: symptoms 
and root causes 
- Four keys to a 
systematic 
innovation 
capability.  
- A model of 
innovation 
effectiveness 
Schlegelmilch 
et al. 
2003 Journal of 
Strategic 
Marketing 
66 Strategic innovation: 
the construct, its 
drivers and its 
strategic outcomes 
Analytical 
conceptual 
Defines the term 
strategic innovation 
and suggests drivers 
such as culture, 
process, people, 
resources 
- Barriers in the 
form of anti-drivers 
Purchasing barriers 
Gadde, 
Håkansson 
1994 European 
Journal of 
Purchasing and 
Supply 
Management 
190 The changing role of 
purchasing: 
reconsidering three 
strategic issues 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Discusses the impact 
of the new view in 
three dimensions of 
purchasing strategy: 
make-or-buy, supply-
base structure, and 
customer-supplier 
relationship 
- Manufacturing 
companies are 
increasingly relying on 
competent suppliers 
- SBR in order to 
exploit supplier 
resources in order 
to improve 
technological 
development 
- Innovations will be 
developed in the 
interaction between 
users and suppliers 
Other / unsorted 
Grant 1996 Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
8483 Toward a 
knowledge-based 
theory of the firm 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Disseminating explicit 
and tacit knowledge in 
an organisation 
- human resource as 
the key resource of a 
firm 
Use it as a basic 
theory for barriers 
that relate to 
knowledge and the 
role of the 
individual 
Roy et al.  2004 Journal of the 
Academy of 
Marketing 
Science 
169 Innovation 
generation in supply 
chain relationships: 
a conceptual model 
and research 
propositions 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Innovation in supply 
chain relationships is a 
consequence of 
interactions between 
buyers and sellers 
- Innovation is the 
result of an interactive 
learning process 
- Factors internal 
and external to the 
relationship affect 
innovation 
generation 
Cooper 1990 Business 
Horizons 
1990 Stage-gate systems: 
a new tool for 
managing new 
products 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Firms rely too much 
on push rather than 
pull 
- The stage-gate model 
is a solution, creating a 
stronger market 
orientation 
- Stage-gate model 
for new products 
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Araujo et al 1999 Industrial 
Marketing 
Management 
284 Managing interfaces 
with suppliers 
Mixed-
methods 
with both 
empirical 
case studies 
and 
analytical 
conceptual 
- A buyer needs a 
variety of interfaces 
- Interfaces are 
interdependent 
- The choice of 
interfaces must take 
dynamic features into 
account 
- Four interface 
categories based on 
the level of 
interaction between 
the supplier and 
customer 
March 1991 Organization 
science 
10416 Exploration and 
exploitation in 
organizational 
learning 
Mixed-
methods 
with 
analytical 
conceptual 
and 
empirical 
simulation 
- Two sets of 
organizational learning 
exploration and 
exploitation 
-There are limited 
resources which will be 
devoted to either 
exploring new 
possibilities or to 
exploiting existing ones 
- To distinguish PPI 
from regular 
procurement 
Petersen et al 2004 Journal of 
Operations 
Management 
454 Supplier integration 
into new product 
development 
Mixed-
methods 
with both 
analytical 
conceptual 
and 
empirical 
survey 
- Supplier involvement - A model for 
supplier 
involvement 
dependent on 
supplier 
responsibility 
Waluszewski, 
Wagrell 
2013 IMP Journal 0 Public purchasing 
policy as innovation 
killer 
Mixed-
methods 
with both 
analytical 
conceptual 
and 
empirical 
survey 
- Only restricted types 
of interactions are 
taken into account in 
the current EU policy 
principles 
- Thick interaction is 
hindered 
- As long as the 
basic policy 
foundation is the 
belief that a 
supplier-public user 
interaction shall be 
as close to a 
traditional market 
as possible, the 
“thick” interaction, 
recognised as being 
critical for renewal 
of resources, will be 
seriously limited 
Håkansson, 
Snehota 
1995 Book (published 
by Routledge) 
2776 Developing 
relationships in 
business networks 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Characteristics of a 
relationship (continuity, 
complexity, symmetry, 
informality) 
- Characteristics of 
process (adaptations, 
cooperation and 
conflict, social 
interaction, 
routinisation) 
- A framework used 
to described 
relationships, from 
arms-length to 
collaboration 
Wagner 2012 Journal of 
Supply Chain 
Management 
3 Tapping Supplier 
Innovation 
Mixed 
methods 
with both 
analytical 
conceptual 
and 
empirical 
survey 
Among other shows 
that integration of 
supplier in early NPD 
phase (fuzzy front end) 
has positive 
implications on NPD 
project performance 
Discusses aspects of 
purchase, such as 
"absorptive 
capacity" 
(organisation) and 
"specific assets" 
(relationship) 
Herzlinger 2006 Harvard 
Business 
Review 
120 Why innovation in 
health care is so 
hard 
Analytical 
conceptual 
- Six drivers/barriers: 
players, funding, policy, 
technology, customers, 
accountability 
- Based on the 
American system, 
mechanisms in Norway 
will differ 
- Explains the 
importance of 
innovation in health 
care and outlines 
specific innovation 
barriers 
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Appendix 2: Interview guide 
Kort om oppgaven 
Fordypningsprosjekt 
Ønsker for utbytte av samarbeidet 
Om intervjuobjektet 
Navn 
Stilling og ansvarsområde 
Erfaring knyttet til innovasjon og/eller innkjøp 
Om strukturen i helseforetaket 
Om innkjøp og innovasjon 
Hvordan foregår en typisk innovasjonsprosess? Hvor oppstår behovet? Hvem deltar i ulike deler 
av prosessen? Hvordan håndteres dette fra ledelsen, er de engasjerte?  
Knytter innovasjon seg til store forandringer? Er det disse store endringene som gir innovasjon 
eller er det også mindre forbedringer? 
Har dere en egen innovasjonsavdeling? Under hvem er innovasjon underlagt? 
Hvordan fungerer en typisk innkjøpsprosess? Hvem er involvert? Er det forskjeller mellom ulike 
typer innkjøp (eksempelvis rammeavtaler og innkjøpsnettverk innen helsesektoren)? 
Hvor bevisst knyttes innovasjon til anskaffelser? 
Konkret om rammeverket 
Strategisk betydning: 
- Blir innkjøp sett på som en støttefunksjon? Er innkjøp strategisk viktig for 
helseforetaket? 
- I hvor stor grad dominerer hensynet til kostnadsbesparelse innkjøpene? Går dette på 
bekostning av for eksempel innovasjon? 
- Oppfatter du at innkjøp gjøres med et langsiktig perspektiv? 
 
Kunnskap og organisasjon: 
- Opplever du at ansatte har tilstrekkelig med kompetanse til å gjennomføre innovative 
innkjøp? Her er det snakk om både innkjøpsspesifikk og produktspesifikk kompetanse. 
- Blir større innkjøp organisert i prosjekter som samler ulike typer kompetanse? Hvis ja, 
kan du fortelle litt om det? Hvis nei, hvorfor ikke? 
- Tror du det er hensiktsmessig at flere innkjøp foregår på regionalt, eventuelt nasjonalt, 
nivå eller er det viktigere at helseforetakene har tilstrekkelig fleksibilitet i sine innkjøp? 
Med fleksibilitet mener vi at helseforetakene kan legge sine egen behov til grunn for 
innkjøpet og at innkjøpet knyttes tettere opp mot den reelle etterspørselen. 
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- Føler du at fordelingen av innkjøp på lokalt, regionalt og nasjonalt nivå er hensiktsmessig 
slik det er nå? Bør innkjøpene være mer lokalt eller nasjonalt? I hvilken retning bør 
trenden gå med tanke på å fremme innovasjon ved hjelp av anskaffelser? 
 
Kultur og motivasjon: 
- Opplever du at det er en kultur for innovasjon i helseforetaket? Hvis ja, kan du gi noen 
eksempler? Hvis nei, hva mener du er utfordringene knyttet til dette? 
- Det pekes ofte på at ansatte i det offentlige vegrer seg mot å ta risiko. Er dette en 
karakteristikk du mener passer HEMIT/Helse Midt? Hvorfor tror du dette er tilfellet? 
 
Leverandørrelasjoner og forskrifter: 
- I hvor stor grad involverer dere leverandører i innkjøpene og innovasjonsprosjekter? 
Dersom det er liten grad av involvering, ser du på dette som et problem for å fremme 
innovative produkter? Hva er i så fall problemet? 
- Ser du på lov om offentlige anskaffelser som en hindring i forhold til det å ha 
nødvendige relasjoner til leverandørene? 
 
Ressurser 
- Har det skjedd at innovasjonsprosjekt har blitt avsluttet på grunn av manglende 
ressurser? 
- Tror du det er problematisk å få tilstrekkelige ressurser for å gjennomføre et større 
innkjøpsprosjekt? Ressurser relaterer seg i første rekke til penger, tid og ansatte.  
- Hvordan stiller toppledelsen seg til innovative anskaffelser? Hva konkret gjør de for å 
fremme det? Frigir de ressurser, hvor involverte er de, etc.? 
 
Oppsummering 
Hva mener du er de største barrierene for å kunne fremme innovative offentlige anskaffelser? 
Har dere noe konkrete prosjekter du tror er relevante for vårt videre arbeid? 
 
